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INTRODUCTION
When someone successfully sues a federal executive branch
official for violating federal law, the federal court’s remedy,
which can be a nationwide national government injunction,
thrusts the court into controversial territory. Critics maintain
that courts grant too many broad nationwide injunctions against
the executive branch. They state a myriad of reasons to oppose
nationwide injunctions: The federal court, they write, lacks authority, power, or jurisdiction to grant a national government
injunction. National government injunctions, they continue, encourage plaintiffs to forum shop. Moreover, multiple lawsuits
create a risk that different courts will grant conflicting injunctions. They politicize the judiciary and prevent issues from
percolating in the federal courts. The injunctions distort the operation of precedent. Critics maintain that a national
government injunction creates asymmetry. National government injunctions, critics argue, benefit nonparties—people who
are not plaintiffs. Finally, critics protest that one trial judge
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should not grant an injunction that halts the whole federal executive branch of the United States government.
This Article disagrees with critics of national government
injunctions. It presents reasons for broad injunctions and favors
a federal judge’s ability to grant a nationwide national government injunction if needed to protect plaintiffs’ rights and to
suppress defendants’ lawbreaking. This Article is based on a professional critique of courts and judges that aspires for neutral
judicial decisions grounded on established principles; it is qualified by the realism of partisan judicial appointments, coupled
with plaintiffs’ wide choices of forum. This Article maintains
that critics’ arguments are incorrect, unconvincing, overstated,
or true only some of the time.
Examining the breadth of the federal courts’ injunctions
against unlawful executive activity will lead this Article through
complex and uncertain territory. After this Introduction, Part I
examines the constitutional framework for national government
injunctions. Constitutional issues include separation of powers
and judicial review. Part II discusses the procedure and remedies that are involved in a national government injunction. It is
followed by Part III, which discusses the threats President
Trump poses to separation of powers and judicial review.
Part IV examines and answers critics’ arguments against
the nationwide national government injunction. It analyzes federal court authority under the headings of subject matter jurisdiction and equitable jurisdiction. It concludes that a federal
district judge has authority and subject matter jurisdiction to
grant plaintiffs an injunction that bars the federal executive
from implementing an unconstitutional or illegal federal government program anywhere in the United States. The judge also
has equitable jurisdiction to choose an injunction and equitable
discretion to shape it.
Critics have not examined the federal courts’ procedure
carefully enough. Part V discusses federal courts’ regular procedure, including filtering techniques, checks against possible mistakes, and grants of complete relief to victims of improper
executive branch measures. Federal litigation procedures include principles of confinement and injunction drafting that
should check abuses.
When this Article says that national government injunction
lawsuits will be litigated in the regular way, it does not mean
that courts will follow ordinary procedures. Deference to the ex-
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ecutive branch defendant requires special judicial handling:
something between ordinary and extraordinary treatment.
When the federal courts apply the procedural techniques they
have been using, and perhaps others suggested below, the procedure is satisfactory to support a nationwide injunction against
a lawbreaking executive branch defendant. No other limitations
are needed or appropriate.
This Article concludes that if the federal courts develop, apply, and mold important procedure, equitable filters, and principles of confinement, a federal court may protect plaintiffs’ rights
by granting a nationwide national government injunction
against an executive branch defendant’s improper activity.
This Article expresses a sense of urgency about the federal
courts’ role in curbing the Trump Administration’s improper
measures. It combines opposition to the incumbent President
with respect for the federal courts.
Trump v. Hawaii concerned complex litigation about the
Trump Administration’s third ban on Muslim immigration. 2 The
district court judge disapproved the ban and granted plaintiffs a
preliminary injunction with nationwide effect. The Supreme
Court majority decided that plaintiffs had not demonstrated a
likelihood of success on the merits, reversed the preliminary injunction, and remanded “for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.” 3 The majority wrote: “Our disposition of the case
[reversing the lower court’s preliminary injunction] makes it unnecessary to consider the propriety of the nationwide scope of
the injunction issued by the District Court.” 4
Both Justice Sotomayor and Justice Thomas set up the open
issues that this Article examines: the breadth and scope of the
injunction that might have followed plaintiffs’ success. In her
dissent, Justice Sotomayor took the position on the injunction’s
scope that this Article supports:
Because the majority concludes that plaintiffs have failed
to show a likelihood of success on the merits, it takes no position on the propriety of the nationwide scope of the
injunction issued by the District Court. The District Court
did not abuse its discretion by granting nationwide relief.
Given the nature of the Establishment Clause violation and
2.
3.
4.

138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
Id.
Id.
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the unique circumstances of this case, the imposition of a nationwide injunction was necessary to provide complete relief
to the plaintiffs. 5

Justice Thomas disagreed. His concurring opinion took the
position that this Article seeks to refute:
Merits aside, I write separately to address the remedy that
the plaintiffs sought and obtained in this case. . . .
I am skeptical that district courts have the authority to enter universal injunctions.
....
. . . [R]ecently, they have exploded in popularity.
....
In sum, universal injunctions are legally and historically
dubious. If federal courts continue to issue them, this court is
duty bound to adjudicate their authority to do so. 6

In late January 2020, Justice Gorsuch agreed with Justice
Thomas. In Department of Homeland Security v. New York, the
Court, in a five to four decision, stayed a preliminary injunction
that forbade enforcement of the Trump Administration’s “public
charge” rule on immigration. 7 Justice Gorsuch’s concurring
opinion turned to the nationwide national government
injunction:
When a district court orders the government not to enforce a
rule against the plaintiffs in the case before it, the court redresses the injury that gives rise to its jurisdiction in the first
place. But when a court goes further than that, ordering the
government to take (or not take) some action with respect to
those who are strangers to the suit, it is hard to see how the
5. Id. at 2446 n.13 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2423 (majority
opinion); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
6. Id. at 2424–29 (Thomas, J., concurring).
7. 140 S. Ct. 599 (2020).
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court could still be acting in the judicial role of resolving cases
and controversies. 8

The reasons Justice Gorsuch gave align with critics’ arguments.
As the Justices’ contrasting opinions reveal, when a federal
court strikes down a federal executive branch initiative, the
court’s authority to grant a national government injunction and
the size and breadth of that injunction are controversial. The
controversy stems from the remedial technique the federal
courts use to stop or limit executive officials from continuing
statutory and constitutional violations. The dispute focuses
more narrowly on injunctions federal courts have granted in the
past and continue to grant on more recent injunctions aimed at
curbing the Trump Administration’s excessive exercises of executive power.
The injunction we are examining has several names, including “nationwide injunction” and “universal injunction.”9
Justice Thomas, as quoted above, and scholar-critic Howard
Wasserman say “universal,” 10 a designation not yet tested
against a NASA astronaut in the International Space Station.
The term this Article uses is “national government injunction,”
sometimes “nationwide national government injunction”: nationwide defines the injunction’s breadth and the defendant is
the national government.
Judges and professors have opposed broad injunctions.11
The Attorney General has instructed United States attorneys to
8. Id. at 600 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Justice Thomas joined the concurring
opinion.
9. Professor Amanda Frost and others use the term “nationwide injunction.”
See Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065,
1071 (2018) (“This Article uses the term ‘nationwide injunction’ to refer to an
injunction at any stage of the litigation that bars the defendant from taking action
against individuals who are not parties to the lawsuit in a case that is not brought
as a class action.”); Alan M. Trammell, Demystifying Nationwide Injunctions, 98
TEX. L. REV. 67 (2019).
10. See Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2425 (Thomas, J., concurring); Howard M.
Wasserman, “Nationwide” Injunctions Are Really “Universal” Injunctions and They
Are Never Appropriate, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335, 338 (2018).
11. Scholarly opposition began right away. The first skeptical article was
Michael T. Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, Rule 23(B)(2), and the Remedial Powers
of the Lower Courts, 97 B.U. L. REV. 615, 620 (2017), which was followed by Samuel
L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L.
REV. 417 (2017). Other critical and skeptical articles followed. See, e.g., Ronald A.
Cass, Nationwide Injunctions’ Governance Problems: Forum-Shopping, Politicizing
Courts, and Eroding Constitutional Structure, 27 GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming
2020); Zachary D. Clopton, National Injunctions and Preclusion, 118 MICH. L. REV.
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oppose nationwide injunctions. 12 In Make the Road New York v.
McAleenan, Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson criticized the Trump
Administration’s arguments to restrict national government injunctions: “[I]t reeks of bad faith, demonstrates contempt for the
authority that the Constitution’s Framers have vested in the judicial branch, and, ultimately, deprives successful plaintiffs of
the full measure of the remedy to which they are entitled.” 13 In
addition, Professor Suzette Malveaux, Professor Amanda Frost,
and others are not opposed to broad injunctions. 14 This Article
takes a more traditional, yet more activist, position in agreeing
with those professors’ general position.
I.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT INJUNCTION
A. Judicial Review

Our treatment of the nationwide national government injunction and United States constitutional law begins with Marbury v. Madison and judicial review. 15 This includes review of
state and federal statutes and federal executive branch
measures.
In Federalist No. 33, Alexander Hamilton maintained that
acts of Congress “which are not pursuant to its constitutional
powers” will not “become the supreme law of the land. These will

1 (2019); Zayne Siddique, Nationwide Injunctions, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (2017);
Wasserman, supra note 10; Russell L. Weaver, Nationwide Injunctions, 14 F.I.U.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2020); Katherine B. Wheeler, Comment, Why There Should
Be a Presumption Against Nationwide Preliminary Injunctions, 96 N.C. L. REV. 200
(2017).
12. Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions III, Att’y Gen., to Heads of Civil
Litigating Components U.S. Att’ys, Litigation Guidelines for Cases Presenting the
Possibility of Nationwide Injunctions (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa
/press-release/file/1093881/download [https://perma.cc/B64W-EQHH] [hereinafter
Sessions Memorandum on Nationwide Injunctions].
13. 405 F. Supp. 3d 1, 66 (D.D.C. 2019).
14. See Spencer E. Amdur & David Hausman, Response, Nationwide
Injunctions and Nationwide Harm, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 49 (2017); Frost, supra
note 9; Suzette Malveaux, Response, Class Actions, Civil Rights, and the National
Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 56 (2017); see also Clopton, supra note 11;
Trammell, supra note 9.
15. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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be merely acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be treated as
such.” 16
Article III of the Constitution states that the Supreme Court
possesses the “judicial Power of the United States.” 17 In 1803, in
Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall operationalized judicial review in the U.S. constitutional system. The Court
held that “the judicial power” included power to interpret the
Constitution and decide whether an act of Congress was unconstitutional: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.” 18 The Court reviewed the legality of executive branch action and held that
courts cannot be bound by a federal statute that is contrary to
the Constitution. 19 “Thus,” Professor Gordon Wood wrote, “the
source of judicial review lay not in the idea of fundamental law
or in written constitutions, but in the transformation of this
written fundamental law into the kind of law that could be expounded and construed in the ordinary court system.” 20 To interpret and implement the Constitution, federal trial and appellate courts may need broad injunctions.
B. Separation of Powers
“When the legislative and executive powers are united in
the same person, or in the same body of magistrates,” the Enlightenment philosopher Montesquieu wrote, “there can be no
liberty.” 21 Judicial review implements separation of powers by
negating Congress’s and the President’s overreaching measures.
Separation of powers developed slowly and unevenly. After
Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court did not declare another
federal statute unconstitutional for over fifty years. In the 1857
Dred Scott 22 decision (one of the Court’s most regressive decisions), the Court declared the Missouri Compromise unconstitu16. THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 208 (Alexander Hamilton) (Carl Van Doren ed.,
1973).
17. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
18. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
19. STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 12–21
(2000); GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC,
1789–1815, at 433–59 (2009).
20. WOOD, supra note 19, at 448.
21. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151 (Hafner Library of
Classics ed., 1959) (1748).
22. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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tional—giving the technique an unsavory and disreputable
quality.
In the meantime, President Jackson thought that Supreme
Court decisions only bound lower courts and that the President
and Congress could decide constitutional issues in ways that disagreed with the federal courts’ decisions. 23 After Worcester v.
Georgia 24 disapproved Cherokee removal in 1832, an angry
Jackson said, “John Marshall has made his decision. Now let
him enforce it.” 25
C. Judicial Review in Action to Curb Executive Branch
Excesses
Distinctions within judicial review are between state and
federal measures and, within federal measures, between statutes and executive orders. After touching on state measures and
federal statutes, this Article focuses on federal executive
measures.
Earlier constitutional defendants were mostly state and local authorities, not the federal government. The courts’ orders
were limited to voiding the unconstitutional state and local government actions. During the Lochner era, the Supreme Court
struck down state statutes on substantive due process
grounds, 26 creating another unsavory odor in liberal nostrils. In
the Civil Rights era, the Court voided state-mandated segregation and Jim Crow statutes. These controversial decisions led to
Massive Resistance and jurisdiction-stripping bills. 27 One reaction to federal courts striking down state statutes was the threejudge district court with a direct appeal to the Supreme Court.28
When the federal government is involved, the Supreme
Court sometimes steps in to void unconstitutional acts of Con23. H. W. BRANDS, HEIRS OF THE FOUNDERS: THE EPIC RIVALRY OF HENRY
CLAY, JOHN CALHOUN, AND DANIEL WEBSTER, THE SECOND GENERATION OF
AMERICAN GIANTS 306–11 (2018).
24. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
25. DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA, 1815–1848, at 412 (2007); see also BREYER, supra
note 19, at 22–31.
26. STEPHEN BUDIANSKY, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: A LIFE IN WAR, LAW, AND
IDEAS 291–95, 409–23 (2019).
27. Caprice Roberts, Jurisdiction Stripping in Three Acts: A Three-String
Serenade, 51 VILL. L. REV. 593, 603 n.31 (2006).
28. The remaining three-judge federal district court handles state
reapportionment.
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gress. Two representative decisions that struck down federal
statutes are United States v. Davis and United States v. Lopez.
In United States v. Davis, the Court struck down the residual
clause of a federal statute that allowed an enhanced sentence
when the defendant used, carried, or possessed a firearm while
committing a crime of violence. 29 The statute’s residual clause
defined a “crime of violence” as a felony “that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person
or property of another may be used in the course of committing
the offense.” 30 The Court struck this clause down as unconstitutionally vague. 31 In United States v. Lopez, the Court considered
the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act, which criminalized possession of a gun in a school zone. 32 The Supreme Court ruled that
the Act exceeded the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers. 33
Judicial review has also been used to curb executive actions,
although historically the President did not possess the amount
of unilateral authority we see today. Except during the Civil War
and Reconstruction, the President occupied a smaller office than
today. With characters like Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, and
John Calhoun, Congress debated and shaped legislative discussions about tariffs, western expansion, and slavery. Theodore
Roosevelt began to transform the presidency into a “bully pulpit.” Later Presidents, including Woodrow Wilson and activist
Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson, expanded
the powers of the President and the executive with the New Deal
and the Great Society. Congress delegated policy initiatives and
power to the executive and administrative agencies. 34
Divided government exists when the President’s party does
not control one or both houses of Congress. Coupled with divided
government, intense partisanship has embittered and clogged
the legislative process. This leads to unilateral executive detours
around Congress. For example:
Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin told the New York
Times in an interview that he was reviewing whether to move
29. 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) (2018).
31. Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2336.
32. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
33. Id.
34. DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, LEADERSHIP: IN TURBULENT TIMES 280–343
(2018); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT VOLUME II: THE
COMING OF THE NEW DEAL, 1933–1935, at 1–27 (2003).
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ahead [with an inflation change that the Justice Department
had earlier rejected] if Congress doesn’t act on its own.
“If it can’t get done through a legislation process, we will
look at what tools at Treasury we have to do it on our own
and we’ll consider that,” Mnuchin told the New York
Times. 35

The Trump Administration, with its fixed views about
stricter immigration, has abandoned the legislative process. It
seeks to control immigration through executive branch
measures. 36 New immigration regulations and executive orders
will lead to more litigation, probably followed by more nationwide national government injunctions.
National government injunctions respond to a paralyzed
Congress as well as the federal executive’s practice of issuing
executive orders and administrative regulations to make major
unilateral policy changes that bypass the legislative process.
Separation of powers and judicial review together enable courts
to prevent the executive’s improper and arbitrary exercise of
power. As Justice Brandeis wrote in his dissenting opinion in
Myers v. United States:
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the
convention of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to preclude
the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid
friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to
the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy. 37

In 1952, the Supreme Court decided its most important case
regarding executive branch overreach. In Youngstown Sheet &
Tube v. Sawyer, the Court struck down the President’s executive
order taking over the steel industry to avert a strike. 38 After an
35. Damian Paletta, Trump Administration Considers Tax Cut for the Wealthy,
WASH. POST (July 30, 2018, 6:21 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business
/economy/trump-administration-considers-tax-cut-for-the-wealthy/2018/07/30
/1dbaafbc-9442-11e8-810c-5fa705927d54 [https://perma.cc/8WD5-PQ2V].
36. Nick Miroff & Josh Dawsey, The Adviser Who Scripts Trump’s Border
Policy, WASH. POST (Aug. 17, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics
/2019/politics/stephen-miller-trump-immigration/ [https://perma.cc/B9B7-EKPN].
37. 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
38. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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accelerated appeal, the Court affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction overturning the executive order. Treated as
the Court’s majority opinion in subsequent decisions, Justice
Jackson’s concurrence rejected inherent executive authority and
vindicated both Congress’s power to create law and courts’ power
to analyze its constitutionality: “With all its defects, delays and
inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long preserving free government except that the Executive be under the
law, and that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations.” 39
Youngstown strengthened the Court’s resolve in future disputes about executive power. For example, in Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, the Court stated, “[I]njunctive relief ‘has
long been recognized as the proper means for preventing entities
from acting unconstitutionally.’” 40 Before that, in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the Court said that “[i]t is settled law that the
separation-of-powers doctrine does not bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the President of the United States.” 41 “[W]e have
long held,” the Court said in Clinton v. Jones, “that when the
President takes official action, the Court has the authority to determine whether he has acted within the law.” 42 “[T]he
Executive is bound to comply with the rule of law,” the Court
concluded in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. 43
Federal courts use national government injunctions as remedies to stop improper measures from the two political branches
and to protect citizens’ constitutional and other substantive
rights. A nationwide national government injunction may be the
only way to extend complete relief to plaintiffs, protect their entitlements, and to avoid illegal or unconstitutional government
policies that harm thousands of others. An independent federal
judiciary needs to be able to grant a national government injunction when appropriate to curb an improper executive initiative.
A nationwide national government injunction leads to national
39. Id. at 655. For background and context, see NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS:
THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (2010)
and MELVIN UROFSKY, DISSENT AND THE SUPREME COURT: ITS ROLE IN THE
COURT’S HISTORY AND THE NATION’S CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE 251–56 (2015).
40. 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001).
41. 457 U.S. 731, 753–54 (1982).
42. 520 U.S. 681, 703 (1997); see also Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 225–
26 (2011); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,
491 n.2 (2010) (discussing injunctions to protect constitutional rights).
43. 548 U.S. 557, 635 (2006).
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uniformity. Sometimes, anything short of a nationwide injunction is impossible to administer and treats similarly situated
victims unequally. 44
Why do federal courts need effective national government
injunctions as remedies to stop improper executive initiatives?
The long-term answer is complete relief for successful plaintiffs,
suppression of lawbreaking, separation of powers, the importance of the courts’ role in enforcing the Constitution, judicial
independence, and judicial review. Developments include the expansion of presidential power, the desiccation of congressional
power, extreme partisanship in Congress, and the federal government’s division between political parties. 45 The short,
contemporary answer, which will be developed below, is the peril
the Trump presidency poses to democratic values.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit responded to
the government’s argument against a national government injunction by emphasizing the role of the trial judge (the initial
decision-maker):
Although the pursuit of nationwide injunctions may be influenced by shifting political motivations, that neither means
that nationwide injunctions themselves are inherently evil,
nor that such injunctions should never be issued. Instead,
courts in determining the proper scope of injunctive relief,
must be cognizant of the potential for such injunctions to
have a profound impact on national policy. 46

The legal subject of the national government injunction was
essentially unstudied until 2015. Professional interest began
when conservative state attorneys general sued to void Obamaera executive branch initiatives. These plaintiffs filed their lawsuits in carefully selected Texas judicial districts where
44. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity,
and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1789 (1991) (observing that
constitutional remedies provide relief to victims and avoid governmental breaches
of the law, the latter of which is, “if not the more fundamental, at least the more
unyielding”).
45. KEVIN M. KRUSE & JULIAN E ZELIZER, FAULT LINES: A HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES SINCE 1974, at 170–71, 202, 296, 301–02, 310–11, 313, 350–52,
357–58 (2019).
46. See City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 288 (7th Cir. 2018), vacated
in part, 2018 WL 4268817 (7th Cir. June 4, 2018), vacated, Nos. 17-2991 & 18-2649,
2018 WL 4268814 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018), stay denied, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL
1963679 (7th Cir. Apr. 24, 2018).

RENDLEMAN_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

900

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

4/17/2020 5:12 PM

[Vol. 91

“friendly” conservative judges were predisposed to oppose
Obama’s measures. Several of the handpicked judges agreed and
granted injunctions against the Administration that forbade it
from implementing Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(DACA), guidelines for treatment of transgender individuals,
and minimum wage thresholds anywhere in the United States.47
Hence, these national government injunctions had nationwide
effect.
After Trump became President, the national government injunction initiative shifted from conservative to liberal. Plaintiffs,
state attorneys general, often alongside membership organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the Southern Poverty Law Center, sued to void Trump Administration
measures and initiatives. The remedies in these lawsuits included injunctions against the Muslim ban, family separation,
and withholding federal funds from sanctuary cities. 48
Litigants’ views of national government injunctions usually
depend on their views of the substantive merits in the lawsuit
and whether they are a winning plaintiff or a losing defendant.
Because politicians are on both winning and losing sides of lawsuits, the national government injunction is bipartisan. Justice
Thomas and former Attorney General Jeff Sessions had previously favored (or not disfavored) national government injunc47. Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 670 (N.D. Tex. 2016)
(granting a nationwide preliminary injunction of a regulation enacted pursuant to
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act); Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 218
F. Supp. 3d 520, 533–34 (E.D. Tex. 2016) (granting a nationwide preliminary
injunction of a minimum wage regulation); Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d
810, 836 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (granting a nationwide preliminary injunction of federal
guidelines allowing individuals to use restrooms, showers, and locker rooms based
on their gender identity as opposed to their biological sex); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep.
Bus. v. Perez, No. 5:16-cv-00066-C, 2016 WL 3766121, at *46 (N.D. Tex. June 27,
2016) (granting a nationwide preliminary injunction of the U.S. Department of
Labor’s Persuader Advice Exemption Rule); Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d
591, 606, 677–78 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (issuing
preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Deferred Action for Parents of
Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA)).
48. Hawaii v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1160–61 (D. Haw. 2017), aff’d in
part, vacated in part, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018);
Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570, 632–33 (D. Md.
2017), aff’d, 883 F.3d 233 (4th Cir.), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2710 (2018); Hawaii v.
Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1239 (D. Haw. 2017), aff’d in part, vacated in part,
859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir.), vacated as moot, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017); Int’l Refugee
Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 566 (D. Md. 2017), aff’d in part,
vacated in part, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir.), vacated as moot, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017);
Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb.
3, 2017).
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tions—yet later they opposed them. 49 When Obama was President and Republicans sued to strike down his policies,
Democratic state attorneys general opposed nationwide national
government injunctions; now that Trump is President and Democratic attorneys general are suing to strike down his policies,
they argue for nationwide national government injunctions. If
the 2020 election puts a Democrat in the White House and Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, we can expect
Republican attorneys general to once again favor the national
government injunction.
II. PROCEDURE AND REMEDIES FOR A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
INJUNCTION
This Part traces a hypothetical plaintiff’s federal lawsuit
that challenges an executive branch defendant’s policy, executive order, regulation, activity, or practice as violating the
Constitution or a federal statute.
The plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the executive branch
defendant broke a substantive law. It ends with a demand for a
remedy to stop the allegedly unlawful activity. The judge finds
for the plaintiff on liability, holding that the government activity
is illegal. The executive branch of the government is a lawbreaker basing its illegal activity on a violation of the
Constitution or a statute. After the executive branch defendant
loses on the substantive merits, it opposes the plaintiff’s remedy.
The judge has four possible remedies. First, a declaratory
judgment that tells the parties what the law says about their
dispute. If the defendants ignore a declaratory judgment, the
judge cannot hold them in contempt. 50 The judge’s second possible remedy is this Article’s focus: an injunction. An injunction is
an in personam order that forbids a defendant’s defined misconduct or orders defined conduct. This Article focuses more on the
“forbid,” or prohibitory injunction, than the mandatory injunction. The judge’s remedy is to grant the successful plaintiff a

49. See City of Chicago, 888 F.3d at 288 (7th Cir. 2018); see also Linda
Greenhouse, Is Clarence Thomas the Supreme Court’s Future?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/02/opinion/contributors/clarence-thomassupreme-court-conservative.html [https://perma.cc/C62L-MZ6X].
50. Doug Rendleman, Prospective Remedies in Constitutional Adjudication, 78
W. VA. L. REV. 155, 162 (1976).
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national government injunction that forbids the executive
branch defendant’s illegal activity.
The national government injunction’s critics pass over the
plaintiff’s lawsuit and the judge’s merits decision for the plaintiff
against the executive branch defendant. The critics enter only at
the remedies stage, when the court grants an injunction against
the executive’s illegal conduct. The critics argue against the
shape and breadth of the judge’s national government
injunction.
The third and fourth possible remedies are closely related to
the national government injunction: the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) remedies of vacatur 51 and statutory
mandamus. 52 Under the APA’s remedy section, a reviewing
court “shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”53
Vacatur, which means setting aside, may affect people who are
not plaintiffs:
In some cases, the “agency action” will consist of a rule of
broad applicability; and if the plaintiff prevails, the result is
that the rule is invalidated, not simply that the court forbids
its application to a particular individual. Under these circumstances a single plaintiff, so long as he is injured by the rule,
may obtain “programmatic” relief that affects the rights of
parties not before the court. 54

Although a reviewing court will usually vacate an illegal measure, it has discretion to remand without vacatur. 55
Courts have not established the relationship between vacatur and a national government injunction. In Regents of the
51. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2018); see also Amdur & Hausman, supra note 14;
Frost, supra note 9.
52. See 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (2018) (noting that mandamus empowers federal
courts to compel certain government officials and agencies “to perform a duty owed
to the plaintiff”).
53. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Mereck & Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
385 F. Supp. 3d 81 (D.D.C. 2019) (vacating rule in excess of statutory authority).
54. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476,
511 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 913 (1990)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)), granting cert., 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019).
55. Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr. v. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, 358 F. Supp. 3d 66, 92–
93 (D.D.C. 2019); Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies and
Equitable Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291 (2003).
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University of California v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the court of appeals gave nationwide relief under vacatur
as a reason to approve a nationwide injunction. 56 In O.A. v.
Trump, plaintiffs sought a national government injunction.57
The government argued that an injunction should benefit only
individual plaintiffs. The judge granted vacatur but no injunction; however, he refused to vacate only in favor of plaintiffs. He
determined that the whole government must obey. 58 On the
other hand, in East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump (a case
about Trump’s limitation of asylum on the Mexican border) the
judge granted a nationwide temporary restraining order (TRO)
based on the APA section that provided for vacatur. 59
Like a declaratory judgment, vacatur will not support contempt if the defendant violates it. If the defendant obeys, which
the federal government does, then vacatur extirpates the agency
action and has the same practical effect as a national government injunction. Courts favoring vacatur over an injunction
have emphasized that an injunction is “extraordinary.” 60
Mandamus under the federal statute allows a federal judge
to compel a government agency or official “to perform a duty
owed to the plaintiff.” 61 Some plaintiffs have sought statutory
mandamus. 62 Mandamus under statute is a narrow and technical remedy: “Mandamus relief is appropriate only where ‘(1)
the plaintiffs have a right to have the act performed, (2) the defendant is under a clear nondiscretionary duty to perform the
act requested, and (3) plaintiff has exhausted all other avenues
56. 908 F.3d at 511.
57. 404 F. Supp. 3d (D.D.C. 2019).
58. Id. at 116–17.
59. 349 F. Supp. 3d 838, 866–67 (N.D. Cal. 2018); Council of Parent Att’ys &
Advocates, Inc. v. DeVos, 365 F. Supp. 3d 28 (D.D.C. 2019), appeal dismissed, No.
19-5137, 2019 WL 4565514 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 18, 2019) (vacating where plaintiffs also
sought an injunction).
60. O.A., 404 F. Supp. 3d at 116–18.
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (2018). Mandamus is also an extraordinary writ used to
seek an interlocutory appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 21. That will be examined below.
Rule 81(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure abolishes mandamus, along with
scire facias. Mandamus’s funeral was premature. Congress passed § 1361 in 1962.
Action to Compel an Officer of the United States to Perform His Duty, Pub. L. No.
87-748, 76 Stat. 744; see 12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3134 (3d ed. 2019). Mandamus survived. The Supreme
Court’s treatment of mandamus shows its confusion in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates
that mandamus is an equitable, not a legal, remedy. 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993).
62. M.M.M. ex rel. J.M.A. v. Sessions, 319 F. Supp. 3d 290 (D.D.C. 2018)
(approving 28 U.S.C. § 1404 transfer where family separation plaintiffs sought
mandamus).
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of relief.’” 63 In sanctuary city lawsuits, courts have granted mandamus where they have also granted injunctions, but stayed or
denied nationwide injunctive relief. 64
An injunction is the plaintiff’s superior remedy because it
will support contempt if the defendant violates it. Plaintiffs
should also consider seeking a declaratory judgment, APA vacatur, and statutory mandamus as alternative remedies or in addition to a national government injunction.
The judge’s injunction will have two principal parts: The
first part details the improper conduct and forbids it. The second
part defines those required to obey the injunction. This Article
de-emphasizes the first part to discuss the second part of the injunction in greater detail. The federal government is an entity
created by law that acts through agents. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65(d)(2) contains the limiting principle: it adjures obedience to an injunction only by the defendant, the defendant’s
agents, and others “in active concert or participation.” 65 This Article focuses on the requirement that a named defendant’s
agents must obey an injunction against their supervisor. The
second part of a national government injunction will order the
named executive branch defendant and his agents to obey.
Agents must obey an injunction against their principal because
they do the principal’s bidding, and the principal will represent
their interest along with his own. 66 The government’s vigorous
and skillful defense in national government injunction lawsuits
assures that the named defendant’s subordinates in the federal
bureaucracy are ably and well represented. The national government injunction’s critics pass over the requirement that the executive branch defendant’s subordinate agents are obliged by
the federal rule to obey.
The named defendant’s successor in office inherits the injunction along with the job. 67 Although an “agent,” the named
executive branch defendant is, in effect, more of an office than a
63. New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 343 F. Supp. 3d 213, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
(quoting City of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729, 739 (2d Cir. 1984)).
64. City & County of San Francisco v. Sessions, 372 F. Supp. 3d 928, 953–54
(N.D. Cal. 2019); County of San Francisco v. Sessions, 349 F. Supp. 3d 924 (N.D.
Cal. 2018), judgment entered sub nom. California ex rel. Becerra v. Sessions, No.
3:17-CV-04701-WHO, 2018 WL 6069940 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2018); New York v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 343 F. Supp. 3d at 242–43.
65. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2); Doug Rendleman, Beyond Contempt: Obligors to
Injunctions, 53 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1975).
66. Rendleman, supra note 65, at 894.
67. FED. R. CIV. P. 25(d).
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person. Courts that have issued national government injunctions have applied the principle of in personam jurisdiction. 68 “A
district court, pursuant to its powers in equity, ‘may command
persons properly before it to cease or perform acts outside its
territorial jurisdiction.’” 69 Generally, under the basic equitable
principle of in personam jurisdiction, an injunction orders the
defendant and its agents to obey wherever they are. The injunction operates worldwide if necessary. A judge with equity power
in a lawsuit with personal jurisdiction over the defendant may
order or forbid the defendant’s improper conduct everywhere. 70
The defendant’s agents must comply with an injunction everywhere those agents are. The federal government is ubiquitous
in the United States. Because the government is everywhere, the
injunction is also ubiquitous. The national government injunction’s critics detour around the requirement of obedience and
emphasize one of the injunction’s effects: they argue, among
other things, that an injunction should not “benefit” people who
are not parties to the lawsuit. 71 This Article emphasizes who
must obey an injunction more than how an injunction affects
nonparties.
Most people comply with court decisions because it is the
right thing to do. If a judge grants a plaintiff an injunction, the
defendant’s agents have a duty to obey because the injunction
applies to the defendant plus its agents, and it is the apparent
law.
If a judge grants a plaintiff an injunction that forbids or
commands the defendant’s conduct, it requires the defendant to
obey everywhere. A national business must be ordered to obey
nationwide. Consider a patent infringement injunction against
a national retail chain; the injunction bans the defendant and its
agent-employees from continuing to infringe upon sales anywhere. Statutes facilitate the plaintiff’s contempt enforcement of
68. City & County of San Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 970; Becerra, 2018 WL
6069940.
69. City & County of San Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 970 (quoting Steele v.
Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 289 (1952) (citing United States v. Oregon, 657
F.2d 1009, 1016 n.17 (9th Cir. 1981) (“When a district court has jurisdiction over
all parties involved, it may enjoin commission of acts outside of its district.”))).
70. See Massie v. Watts, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 148 (1810); Koehler v. Bank of
Berm. Ltd., 101 F.3d 863 (2d Cir. 1996); Michael Douglas, Extraterritorial
Injunctions Affecting the Internet, 12 J. EQUITY 34, 35 n.5 (2018).
71. See Sessions Memorandum on Nationwide Injunctions, supra note 12; Bray,
supra note 11; Cass, supra note 11; Morley, supra note 11, at 616; Wasserman,
supra note 10, at 356.
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trademark and copyright injunctions in other federal courts.72
The forum court may punish a defendant’s violation of an injunction in another jurisdiction as forum contempt. 73
Under rule of law and traditional equitable principles, the
defendant who is an executive branch official also should obey
the judge’s injunction. Why might the government ask for different treatment?
III. TRUMP CHALLENGES JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SEPARATION OF
POWERS
The national government injunction is one important tool
among several to reduce the damage the Trump Administration
has inflicted and is likely to continue to inflict. “Experience over
the last two years,” Professor Steve Burbank write, “has reminded us that, in times of aspiring authoritarianism in the executive branch and serial subservience in the legislative branch,
independent and accountable courts are the bulwark of our freedoms.” 74 “This nation,” the Supreme Court wrote in Ex parte
Milligan, “has no right to expect that it will always have wise
and humane rulers, sincerely attached to the principles of the
Constitution. Wicked men, ambitious of power, with hatred of
liberty and contempt of law, may fill the place once occupied by
Washington and Lincoln.” 75
Trump challenges the basic principles of separation of powers and judicial review: Trump once remarked, “I have an Article
II, where I have the right to do whatever I want as president.”76
The desiccation of Congress at the expense of the President
set the stage for President Trump’s executive activity. Trump is
taking advantage of past Congresses’ excessive delegations of
power to the executive branch to implement his autocratic and
authoritarian views. His measures threaten democratic institu-

72. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a), (b) (2018); 17 U.S.C. § 502(b) (2018).
73. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 237 (1998).
74. Stephen B. Burbank, Reconsidering Judicial Independence: Forty-Five
Years in the Trenches and in the Tower, 168 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 18, 34 (2019).
75. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 125 (1866).
76. Michael Brice-Saddler, While Bemoaning Mueller Probe, Trump Falsely
Says the Constitution Gives Him ‘the Right to Do Whatever I Want’, WASH. POST
(July 23, 2019, 7:46 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/07/23
/trump-falsely-tells-auditorium-full-teens-constitution-gives-him-right-dowhatever-i-want/ [https://perma.cc/KSZ6-EXNH].
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tions. The Republican party has been unwilling to challenge
Trump’s measures. History provides no guidance. 77
Trump’s executive orders challenge the rule of law: the principle that “every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals” and is responsible for “every
act done without legal justification.” 78 Professor Driesen examined the executive orders and concluded that Trump’s “collection
of decrees poses an unprecedented challenge to our constitutional democracy as a system.” 79 Judge Gertner wrote, “[A]ll of
this may look different with new Trump appointees emboldened
. . . on an explicit mission to transform the decisional law. Their
goal may be to change the prevailing assumptions of the past
thirty years—about civil rights, the rights of criminal defendants, checks and balances, etc.” 80
For example, the Trump Administration’s immigration policy of “zero-tolerance,” its separation of children from their parents, and its begrudging obedience to court orders to reunite the
families are unique in their overreach and long-term harm to the
children. 81 The Trump Administration’s contempt for and disregard of separation of powers and the rule of law differs in kind
from the preceding administration’s approach. The Obama and
Trump Administrations should not be equated. 82

77. Katie Shepherd, Trump ‘Violates All Recognized Democratic Norms,’
Federal Judge Says in Biting Speech on Judicial Independence, WASH. POST (Nov.
8, 2019, 4:41 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/11/08/judge-saystrump-violates-democratic-norms-judiciary-speech/
[https://perma.cc/B9SFMRVC].
78. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 189 (6th ed. 1902).
79. David M. Driesen, President Trump’s Executive Orders and the Rule of Law,
87 UMKC L. REV. 489, 490 (2019).
80. Nancy Gertner, The “Lower” Federal Courts: Judging in a Time of Trump,
93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. ONLINE 7, 13 (2018).
81. Maria Sacchetti, ACLU Says 1,500 More Migrant Children Were Taken
from Parents By the Trump Administration, WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2019, 7:28 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/aclu-says-1500-more-migrantchildren-were-taken-from-parents-by-trump-administration/2019/10/24/d014f818f6aa-11e9-a285-882a8e386a96 [https://perma.cc/MM4R-B9MH]; Maria Sacchetti,
ACLU: U.S. Has Taken Nearly 1,000 Child Migrants from Their Parents Since
Judge Ordered Stop to Border Separations, WASH. POST (July 30, 2019, 2:03 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/aclu-us-has-taken-nearly-1000child-migrants-from-their-parents-since-judge-ordered-stop-to-border-separations
//07/30/bde452d8-b2d5-11e9-8949-5f36ff92706e [https://perma.cc/3LW7-3ETY].
82. See Driesen, supra note 79, at 518–24.
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Federal judges have ruled against the Trump administration
at least 63 times over the past two years, an extraordinary
record of legal defeat that has stymied large parts of the president’s agenda on the environment, immigration and other
matters. . . .
....
. . .[T]he rulings so far paint a remarkable portrait of a government rushing to implement far-reaching changes in policy
without regard for long-standing rules against arbitrary and
capricious behavior. 83

Trump is the President our forefathers warned us against. 84
Madison and Hamilton feared concentrated power. As the Seventh Circuit noted in City of Chicago v. Sessions:
The founders of our country well understood that the concentration of power threatens individual liberty and established a bulwark against such tyranny by creating a
separation of powers among the branches of government. If
the Executive Branch can determine policy, and then use the
power of the purse to mandate compliance with that policy by
the state and local governments, all without the authorization or even acquiescence of elected legislators, the check
against tyranny is forsaken. 85

83. Fred Barbash & Deanna Paul, The Real Reason the Trump Administration
Is Constantly Losing in Court, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2019, 10:05 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-real-reason-presidenttrump-is-constantly-losing-in-court/2019/03/19/f5ffb056-33a8-11e9-af5bb51b7ff322e9 [https://perma.cc/MCY5-SLBE]; see also Fred Barbash, Trump’s
Immigration Policies Fail Time and Again When Faced with Scrutiny from the
Federal Courts, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2019, 5:07 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trumps-immigration-policiesfail-time-and-again-when-faced-with-scrutiny-from-the-federal-courts/2019/04/11
/e2bfcc5a-5bb3-11e9-9625-01d48d50ef75 [https://perma.cc/L83B-22QX] (reporting
twenty-five Trump losses in immigration cases).
84. Ron Chernow, Hamilton Pushed for Impeachment Powers. Trump Is What
He Had in Mind, WASH. POST (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/outlook/2019/10/18/hamilton-pushed-impeachment-powers-trump-is-what-hehad-mind/ [https://perma.cc/X8FL-Q9NC].
85. City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 277 (7th Cir. 2018), stay denied,
2018 WL 1963679 (7th Cir. Apr. 24, 2018), reh’g en banc granted in part, opinion
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Former federal District Judge Nancy Gertner concluded that the
“challenges to checks and balances, to the separation of powers,
even to elementary notions of federalism, are not abstract but
concrete; not aberrant but systemic.” 86
Trump’s excesses are not the reason for the national government injunction, but they illustrate why courts need the national
government injunction as an available judicial remedy. Trump’s
disregard for the integrity of democratic institutions, norms,
processes, and rules threatens our constitutional order and the
rule of law. His authoritarian, unilateralist approach to government threatens government by decree. His impulsive disrespect
for the traditional limits on his office has opened a new frontier
in executive overreach. 87 Will the constitutional system of separation of powers, an independent judiciary, federalism, and freedom of speech provide accountability? 88
In 2019, Trump’s complete opposition to congressional oversight subpoenas opened a new chapter in the question of continuing obedience to court orders. 89 Trump’s refusal to cooperate
with the House of Representatives’ inquiry seeking testimony
and documents as part of the impeachment process raised questions about the executive branch’s willingness to obey court orders and injunctions. In response to one refusal, Judge Ketanji
Brown Jackson wrote:
[B]latant defiance of Congress’ centuries-old power to compel
the performance of witnesses is not an abstract injury, nor is
it a mere banal insult to our democracy. It is an affront to the
mechanism for curbing abuses of power that the Framers
carefully crafted for our protection, and, thereby, recalcitrant

vacated in part, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268817 (7th Cir. June 4, 2018), vacated,
No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268814 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018).
86. Gertner, supra note 80, at 85.
87. Shepherd, supra note 77.
88. See Gertner, supra note 80 (outlining no appreciation of constitutional
checks and balances, no sense of the limits of his own authority).
89. See Jennifer Rubin, If the Administration Defied a Court Order, All Bets
Are Off, WASH. POST (June 2, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/opinions/2019/06/02/if-administration-defied-court-order-all-bets-are-off/ [https://
perma.cc/T6A3-WJP6]; Steve Vladeck, Trump Isn’t Just Defying Congress. He’s
Rejecting the Whole Idea of Oversight., WASH. POST (Apr. 26, 2019, 11:53 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/trump-isnt-just-defying-congress-hesrejecting-the-whole-idea-of-oversight/2019/04/26/acf0a00a-67c9-11e9-a1b6b29b90efa879_story.html [https://perma.cc/XMP8-JK3V].
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witnesses actually undermine the broader interests of the
People of the United States. 90

If it occurs, disobedience will undermine the integrity of the law
and the public’s respect for it. 91
Does the executive branch accept a powerful and independent judiciary? The Trump Administration has thus far complied
with every national government injunction against it. 92 Professor Parrillo is less optimistic about obedience. Parrillo wrote that
contempt’s shaming power
depends on how deeply and exclusively the defendant official
is committed to the group(s) that hold dear the norm.
....
. . . Rising partisan polarization could, ultimately, diminish
the shaming power of contempt findings if people affiliated
with a political party come to dismiss any contempt finding
that goes against officials of their party. 93

Whether that prediction describes the present state of the
Trump Administration’s recalcitrance and polarization remains
to be seen.
Then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions did not realize he was
supporting this Article’s concern about Trump’s improper activity when he said of national government injunctions that “[t]his
kind of judicial activism did not happen a single time in our first
175 years as a nation, but it has become common in recent years.
90. Comm. on Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives v. McGahn, 415 F.
Supp. 3d 148, 191 (D.D.C. 2019), vacated and remanded sub nom. Comm. on
Judiciary v. McGahn, 951 F.3d 510 (D.C. Cir. 2020), reh’g en banc granted, opinion
vacated sub nom. U.S. House of Representatives v. Mnuchin, No. 19-5176, 2020 WL
1228477 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 13, 2020)
91. Steve Vladeck, What Would Happen if Trump Ignored a Divided Supreme
Court Ruling Against Him?, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/10/14/what-would-happen-if-trumpignored-divided-supreme-court-ruling-against-him/
[https://perma.cc/A5MCYGRC].
92. Tara Leigh Grove, Foreword: Some Puzzles of State Standing, 94 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1883 (2019).
93. Nicholas R. Parrillo, The Endgame of Administrative Law: Governmental
Disobedience and the Judicial Contempt Power, 131 HARV. L. REV. 685, 791–93
(2018).
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It has happened to the Trump administration 25 times in less
than two years.” 94 This Article was written in 2018 and 2019 in
the hope that, after the 2020 election, much of it will have become obsolete because the United States will have returned to a
“normal” level of executive lawbreaking, with the federal court’s
injunction remedy intact. 95
This Article’s central idea is that Trump’s threat to the Constitution and basic liberties needs to be curbed. The nationwide
national government injunction is one part of that effort. As
King Henry cried in Shakespeare’s Henry V: “Once more unto
the breach, dear friends, once more.” 96
IV. REPLY TO CRITICS OF THE NATIONWIDE NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT INJUNCTION
What do critics think is improper about a national government injunction? Critics of national government injunctions articulate several reasons to oppose them: The federal court lacks
authority, power, or jurisdiction to grant a national government
injunction. National government injunctions encourage forum
shopping. They create a risk of conflicting injunctions. They politicize the judiciary.
National government injunctions, critics also argue, erode
the percolation of issues in the federal courts. They distort the
usual operation of precedent. An argument that critics empha94. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Sessions Releases
Memorandum on Litigation Guidelines for Nationwide Injunctions Cases (Sept. 13,
2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-sessions-releases-memoran
dum-litigation-guidelines-nationwide-injunctions [https://perma.cc/XJM4-EDWM].
95. Another indirect confirmation of the Trump Administration’s differences in
kind comes from observing big-firm lawyers. Republicans have found it difficult to
find and pay lawyers to challenge measures from the Obama Administration; the
lawyers discovered that the work was unpopular in their firms. But skilled lawyers
who are excited to oppose Trump Administration measures are working pro bono,
without fees. “There’s a whole range of stuff that Republican administrations
engage in all the time, and you don’t see the law firms challenging it,” former Acting
Solicitor General and current Hogan Lovells partner Neal Katyal said. “But what’s
going on here, like the census case, is so beyond the pale. That’s why you’re seeing
lawyers stand up and do this.” Jacqueline Thomsen, Big Law Billed Republicans
Millions to Sue Obama. Against Trump, Firms Are Working for Free, LAW.COM
(Aug. 22, 2019, 3:00 PM), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2019/08/22/biglaw-billed-republicans-millions-to-sue-obama-against-trump-firms-are-workingfor-free/ [https://perma.cc/F95F-3FHY] (explaining that House Republicans
struggled to find lawyers willing to work on their challenges to the Obama
Administration due to the unpopularity of the stances).
96. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY V act 3, sc. 1.
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size is that national government injunctions benefit nonparties.
Critics also maintain that a national government injunction creates asymmetry. Finally, critics’ best argument is that a
national government injunction allows a single trial judge to
stop the whole federal executive branch of the United States government.
This Article disagrees with the national government injunction’s critics. It favors a judge’s ability to grant a nationwide national government injunction. Its position is that a federal district judge has jurisdiction and authority to grant an injunction
that bars the federal executive from implementing an unconstitutional or illegal federal government program anywhere in the
United States.
This Article responds to the critics’ arguments. It maintains
that their arguments are unconvincing, incorrect, overstated, or
only true some of the time. It rephrases the critics’ final argument as contesting the role of a federal court in halting illegal
federal executive overreach. It concludes that if the federal
courts develop, apply, and mold important procedural and equitable filters and principles of confinement, a federal court may
grant a plaintiff a nationwide national government injunction
against an executive branch defendant’s improper activity.
Critics’ opposition to national government injunctions resembles arguments for tort reform. In this context, large-scale
tortfeasors, who are unlikely underdogs, take their arguments
to appellate courts and legislatures. They posit mistrust for the
judges and juries who made the initial decisions, and they oppose what they view as excessive remedies. Similarly, in
opposing a national government injunction, executive branch defendants, who have already lost on the merits, seek to
circumscribe the winner’s remedy. The national government injunction’s opponents have sought relief in both legislatures and
courts. A damages cap is a typical tort reform goal. 97 Opponents
here similarly seek to “cap” or reduce the size or breadth of the
injunction that the trial judge may grant.
Injunction reform has taken legislative form. This Article
will mention only the high points of earlier legislative injunction
reform. The granddaddy is the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which

97. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008); BMW of N. Am., Inc.
v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); see also AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, https://www.atra.org
(last visited Nov. 26, 2019) [https://perma.cc/BUK2-8LG4].
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curbs a federal court’s ability to enjoin a strike. 98 The Prison
Litigation Reform Act 99 also legislated another injunction
reform against structural condition injunctions in prisons.
Grandstanding members of Congress have introduced “jurisdiction-stripping” bills and constitutional amendments, for
example, to end federal judges’ busing injunctions to desegregate
schools. 100 Legislative injunction reform bills have been introduced in both the 115th and 116th Congresses to forbid nonparty
national government injunctions (except in class actions) and to
limit attacks on federal measures to the District of Columbia district courts. 101
Before the 2018 election, when the Republicans controlled
the House of Representatives, a House subcommittee held a
hearing on legislation that would limit national government injunctions to the District of Columbia federal courts. 102 Following
the 2018 election, the new Democratic majority in the House
seems unlikely to renew interest in legislation that reduces federal courts’ ability to curb illegal Trump Administration
measures. All of the bills’ sponsors have been Republicans. Although my calls to committee staff lawyers were not returned, a
likely conclusion is that the House bills are dead on arrival in
the Democratic House, and if the Senate takes any action on the
Senate bills, they are dead on arrival in the House.

98. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–110 (2018).
99. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2018).
100. Roberts, supra note 27, at 628 n.146.
101. Nationwide Injunction Abuse Prevention Act of 2019, S. 2464, 116th Cong.
(2019); Nationwide Injunction Abuse Prevention Act of 2019, H.R. 4292, 116th
Cong. (2019); Injunctive Authority Clarification Act of 2019, H.R. 77, 116th Cong.
(2019); Injunctive Authority Clarification Act of 2018, H.R. 6730, 115th Cong.
(2018); Assigning Proper Placement of Executive Action Lawsuits Act (APPEAL
Act), H.R. 2660, 115th Cong (2017).
102. The Role and Impact of Nationwide Injunctions by District Courts: Hearing
Before Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (Nov. 30, 2017); H.R. 2660; see also H.R. 6730, 115th
Cong. (2018) (directing that no federal court may issue “an order that purports to
restrain the enforcement against a non-party of any statute, regulation, order, or
similar authority”). In February 2020, a Senate committee held a hearing on one of
the injunction reform bills. The senators appeared to conclude that the courts
should decide how to handle nationwide injunctions. Jacqueline Thomsen,
Lawmakers, Stuck in Political Deadlock, Look to Supreme Court to Fix National
Injunctions,
LAW.COM:
NAT’L
L.J.
(Feb.
25,
2020,
1:31
PM)
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2020/02/25/lawmakers-stuck-in-politicaldeadlock-look-to-supreme-court-to-fix-national-injunctions/
[https://perma.cc/
DJ2E-KTCH].
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One of this Article’s goals is to show that neither judicial nor
legislative injunction reform of nationwide national government
injunctions is needed.
A. The Federal Courts’ Jurisdiction and Authority
This Article will next discuss the federal courts’ authority
under the technical subject of jurisdiction. This lengthy treatment establishes the federal courts’ authority and jurisdiction
and articulates the federal courts’ posture toward the national
government injunction.
Critics question the federal courts’ ability, authority, or jurisdiction to grant a national government injunction. 103 The constitutional argument against nationwide injunctions is difficult
to figure out. The argument that federal judges lack the authority or jurisdiction to grant national government injunctions is
both underdeveloped and understated. Justice Thomas and
other critics seem to assert that the nationwide injunction is not
included in the federal courts’ Article III “judicial Power” or “Equity” power. 104 They appear to base this assertion on the
argument that the nationwide injunction only recently emerged
as a remedy. Justice Thomas seeks to limit the courts’ remedial
power and to return the federal courts’ remedial power to an imagined past. Careful scholarship has uncovered nonparty
injunctions and precursors of the nationwide injunction far earlier than critics assert. The federal courts’ Article III power to
decide cases in “Equity” extends jurisdiction to all levels of the
United States courts to grant an injunction. Jurisdiction in equity includes jurisdiction to grant a plaintiff a broad injunction
as relief for a defendant’s wrong. The constitutional argument
against the national government injunction fails. 105
This Article will develop the federal courts’ authority 106 and
jurisdiction. 107 This discussion is based on traditional equitable
103. See Bray, supra note 11; Morley, supra note 11, at 616; Wasserman, supra
note 10.
104. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424–29 (Thomas, J., concurring).
105. See Brief of Amici Curiae Legal Historians in Support of Plaintiff and
Appellee the City of Chicago at 26–28, City of Chicago v. Whitaker, No. 18-2885
(7th Cir. Nov. 15, 2018); Trammell, supra note 9; Mila Sohoni, The Lost History of
the “Universal” Injunction, 133 HARV. L. REV. 920 (2020); James E. Pfander & Jacob
Wentzel, The Common Law Origins of Ex parte Young, 72 STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 4 n.13).
106. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2424–29 (Thomas, J., concurring).
107. See Bray, supra note 11; Wasserman, supra note 10.
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analysis of subject matter jurisdiction and equitable jurisdiction.
It is based on and follows the late Harvard Professor Zechariah
Chafee’s 1950 analysis in Some Problems of Equity. 108 It distinguishes the two. It identifies the courts’ subject matter jurisdiction to grant a nationwide national government injunction. It
classifies decisions about a national government injunction under equity jurisdiction, and it analyzes the consequences of that
classification.
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
A court’s jurisdiction falls under two major headings. First
is its personal jurisdiction over the defendant. This Article’s discussion of the national government injunction takes the federal
courts’ personal jurisdiction over the defendant for granted. Second, is our topic: subject matter jurisdiction.
A court has subject matter jurisdiction when the Constitution or statute says that this court can decide this kind of dispute. 109 An opponent of a judgment has an incentive to characterize it as based on a lack of jurisdiction and void, rather than
erroneous. The opponent seeks to obtain the benefit of lack of
jurisdiction: voidness instead of error.
A court’s decision that subject matter jurisdiction is absent
differs from its conclusion that an earlier decision is substantively incorrect. A decision by a court without subject matter jurisdiction is void; it is vulnerable to collateral attack in a later
lawsuit. A void judgment is not entitled to preclusive res judicata effect or to full faith and credit. There are no time limits on
collateral attack. One benefit is that a timing rule that defines
subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, or sua
sponte by the judge, because the proceeding is void. On the other
hand, if a filing requirement is not jurisdictional, the defendant
must raise it in a timely manner or else it will be waived.110 A
second benefit for the defendant is that a void injunction will not
support criminal contempt but, because of the collateral bar rule,
an incorrect injunction will. 111
A decision by a court with subject matter jurisdiction that is
substantively incorrect is erroneous. It is entitled to preclusive
108.
109.
110.
111.

ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS IN EQUITY 302 (1950).
Id.
Fort Bend County. v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843 (2019).
Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 321 (1967).
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res judicata effect or to full faith and credit in a collateral attack.
An opponent’s direct attack must occur within time limits. A
substantively incorrect injunction will support the defendant’s
criminal contempt.
For a court of general jurisdiction, the test for subject matter
jurisdiction is straightforward: do the Constitution and statutes
give this court the power to decide this kind of lawsuit? 112 Federal courts’ subject matter jurisdiction is more complex because
federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction with two
principal heads: diversity of citizenship and litigation “arising
under” the federal Constitution or laws. 113 This Article
discusses the second form of federal jurisdiction. The federal
question lawsuits we are studying “arise under” because the
plaintiffs sue federal executive branch defendants who, plaintiffs allege, are violating the federal Constitution, statutes, or
policy.
Article III grants the federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over “all Cases, in Law and Equity.” 114 This grant includes
the federal courts’ power to issue the equitable remedy of an injunction. 115 This Article analyzes the type of injunction the
federal court may grant.
A court’s subject matter jurisdiction does not depend on the
merits of the lawsuit. 116 A decision of a court without subject
matter jurisdiction is void without referring to whether the decision is “correct” under substantive law. 117 “The test of jurisdiction is not [the court’s] right decision, but the [court’s] right to
enter upon the inquiry and make some decision.” 118
Professor Chafee supported his points about a court’s subject matter jurisdiction with two policies. First is the “bright
line” policy: “The boundary between judicial power and nullity
should . . . if possible, be a bright line, so that very little thought
is required to enable judges to keep inside it.” 119 A judge should
be able to decide on subject matter jurisdiction—whether this
112. See CHAFEE, supra note 108, at 302 (“If th[e] requisites are satisfied, . . . we
can say that a federal district court almost always has jurisdiction over the subject
matter.”).
113. U.S. CONST. art. III; 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2018).
114. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
115. The Judiciary Act of 1789 section 11 was not carried into the 1948 revision.
116. See CHAFEE, supra note 108, at 297.
117. See id. at 308.
118. Id. (quoting United States v. Ness, 230 F. 950, 953 (8th Cir. 1916), rev’d,
245 U.S. 319 (1917)).
119. Id. at 312.
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lawsuit belongs in this court—by applying a “bright line” or simple, straightforward rule about the court. Neither the merits of
the litigation nor the relief the plaintiff seeks are relevant to
subject matter jurisdiction.
Second, is the “first things first” policy: “Most well-recognized limitations on judicial power are of such a nature that a
trial court can dispose of them rapidly in a preliminary proceeding before going into the merits at all.” 120 The judge should decide on the court’s subject matter jurisdiction before reaching the
more complex decision on the lawsuit’s substantive merits and
remedy. In brief, a court should decide lack of jurisdiction at the
outset of a lawsuit by applying straightforward rules. An example that first-year civil procedure students study is the requirement that a defendant must raise lack of personal jurisdiction
right away, at peril of waiving it. 121
In addition to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, a judge
must heed the principles of correct substantive and remedial decision-making. A judge’s decision that is contrary to these principles is wrong. The judgment is erroneous; an appellate court
ought to reverse it. But the judgment is valid and entitled to both
preclusion and full faith and credit. 122
Courts may confuse questions of power or jurisdiction with
those of judgment or discretion. Courts have struggled with the
distinction between mistaken-but-valid injunctions and void
ones. Violations of defective and objectionable injunctions tempt
appellate courts to find that the injunction is void to avoid the
criminal contempt that the collateral bar rule inevitably produces. “Where concepts like ‘subject matter jurisdiction’ are held
out as placing limitations on a court’s authority to decide, the
issue may be better understood in terms of the well-developed
principles concerning the exercise of jurisdiction.” 123
The present Supreme Court appears to favor tight definitions of subject matter jurisdiction as it relates to timing and
deadlines. In Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, the
Court defined subject matter jurisdiction as “the courts’ statu-

120. Id. at 317.
121. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(g)–(h). A federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction is too
important to be waived. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).
122. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 236–37 (1908); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 30 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
123. Douglas, supra note 70, at 41–42, 45 (emphasis omitted).
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tory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” 124 The
Court’s decision examined filing requirements that defendants
have characterized as jurisdictional to avoid deadlines. In 2019,
the Court said that it needed “[t]o ward off profligate use of the
term” jurisdiction. 125 In 2010, the Court criticized promiscuous
“drive-by jurisdictional rulings.” 126 Jurisdiction, the Court said,
refers to “a court’s adjudicatory authority” and is correctly applied only to “prescriptions delineating the classes of cases” (subject matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction)
implicating that authority. 127 In Fort Bend County v. Davis in
2019, the Court rejected the defendant’s argument that a claimfiling requirement was jurisdictional. The defendant must
timely raise the non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule or forfeit it. 128
The Court’s tight definitions of subject matter jurisdiction
appear to implement Chafee’s “bright line” and “first things
first” policies. In Stern v. Marshall, it said that “[b]ecause
‘[b]randing a rule as going to a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction
alters the normal operation of our adversarial system,’ [we are
not inclined to interpret statutes as creating a jurisdictional bar]
when they are not framed as such.” 129 “[T]raditional tools of
statutory construction,” the Court said in 2015 in United States
v. Kwai Fun Wong, “must plainly show that Congress imbued a
procedural bar with jurisdictional consequences.” 130

124. 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (emphasis omitted); see also Fort Bend County v.
Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843 (2019); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274
(1994).
125. Fort Bend County, 139 S. Ct. at 1848 (quoting Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med.
Ctr., 568 U.S. 145 (2013)). The subject matter jurisdiction issue in 2019 was
whether “Title VII’s charge-filing precondition to suit [is] a ‘jurisdictional’
requirement that can be raised at any stage of a proceeding; or is . . . a procedural
prescription mandatory if timely raised, but subject to forfeiture if tardily asserted.”
Id. at 1846.
126. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 161 (2010) (asserting that
the copyright registration prerequisite for suing was not jurisdictional). In 2019,
the Court approved the registration prerequisite to sue when a defendant timely
moved to dismiss. Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, L.L.C.,
139 S. Ct. 881, 892 (2019).
127. Fort Bend Cty., 139 S. Ct. at 1848 (citing Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443,
455 (2004)).
128. Id. at 1849.
129. 564 U.S. 462, 479–80 (2011) (quoting Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428,
434 (2011).
130. 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1632 (2015).
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The federal court has subject matter jurisdiction in equity
to grant the equitable remedy of an injunction, which includes a
broad, even nationwide, injunction.
2. Equity Jurisdiction
What is equity jurisdiction and how does equity jurisdiction
fit with subject matter jurisdiction in determining the difference
between void and erroneous judgments? Courts’ decisions about
equity jurisdiction are decisions about whether to grant an equitable remedy and, if so, what form it should take.
Chafee discussed courts’ fuzzy thinking about equity jurisdiction. He began by addressing the limited federal subject matter jurisdiction that exists when the Constitution and statutes
grant the courts power because the United States district court
has Article III power in “Equity.” As a court of equity, the judge
has power to grant an injunction. The court, we assume, has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. If so, the judge has subject
matter jurisdiction. The judge’s subject matter jurisdiction
means that the judge’s decisions about equity jurisdiction and
the judge’s injunction decision are valid, not void. 131
Lack of equity jurisdiction, Chafee maintained, means that
an injunction is erroneous. It does not mean the injunction is
void. Equity jurisdiction is not jurisdictional. “[T]oday, with law
and equity merged in a single court, equity jurisdiction . . . is
simply a bundle of sound principles of decision concerning particular kinds of relief.” 132
A court’s decision about equity jurisdiction is not a question
of power but one of judgment, discretion, and wisdom. Chafee
doubted “if there are any truly void decrees from courts with equity powers, except for lack of jurisdiction over the person.”133
Courts have jurisdiction to decide both bad claims and good
claims. A federal district judge with subject matter jurisdiction
in equity to grant an injunction has equitable discretion to grant
an injunction that is erroneous. “In cases of doubt, it is wise to
let the rule in question operate merely as a principle of right decision like most other judge-made and statutory rules.” 134 Characterizing a valid but erroneous injunction as a void one is,
131.
132.
133.
134.

CHAFEE, supra note 108, at 304.
Id.
Id. at 374.
Id. at 311.
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Chafee wrote, “a clumsy way to get rapid review of [an] especially objectionable decree . . . .” 135
Equity jurisdiction, in Chafee’s better view, does not limit
the federal courts’ power to decide. It deals, in Chief Justice
Stone’s words, with “whether the case is one for the peculiar type
of relief which a court of equity is competent to give.” 136 If it is
the latter, a federal district court judge has subject matter jurisdiction to decide the issues in this lawsuit and to grant this
plaintiff relief—a national government injunction—if “the case
is one for the peculiar type of relief which a court of equity is
competent to give.” 137
The court’s subject matter jurisdiction to grant an injunction includes the power to grant an incorrect injunction. An erroneous nationwide national government injunction does not
show a lack of subject matter jurisdiction or power, but a mistaken use of power: it is incorrect, but it is not void.
The legal system, Chafee insisted, needs an avenue for
“rapid relief from a very obnoxious kind of injunction.” 138 This
avenue takes the form of stays and accelerated appeals. A defendant who disagrees with an injunction should move to modify
or dissolve it, or file an appeal, instead of violating the injunction
and arguing against it if charged with criminal contempt. Because he favored respect for the law and the rule of law, Chafee
condemned the defendant’s disobedience. “Respect for courts,”
he wrote, “will best be promoted by a hard and fast rule that all
valid decrees must be obeyed until set aside by a judge.” 139
If an early analogy vindicates equity jurisdiction for a nationwide national government injunction, the writ of mandamus
in Marbury v. Madison is an early analogy to the national government injunction. “The very essence of civil liberty certainly
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection
of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.” 140 Mandamus,
an order to a defendant to do something within the defendant’s

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 380.
Di Giovanni v. Camden Fire Ins., 296 U.S. 64, 69 (1935).
Id.
CHAFEE, supra note 108, at 347.
Id. at 360.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 161 (1803).
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duty, 141 is a functional mandatory injunction. The mandamus in
Marbury is a legal remedy by an individual against the federal
executive. The legal writs—mandamus and prohibition—provided specific relief against government misconduct and served
as precursors of injunctions. 142
While mandamus withered, the injunction flourished. The
injunction became a remedy of choice: the central prospective equitable remedy. Pfander and Wentzel’s careful research shows
several crucial points. 143 Technicalities chipped away at federal
mandamus. State courts nevertheless adopted and broadened
the legal writs of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition to suppress improper government measures. When the state courts
perceived the legal writs were no longer adequate legal remedies, they turned to equity and the injunction remedy to stop
improper government measures and to obviate a multiplicity of
suits. After Congress enacted the federal courts’ general federal
question jurisdiction in 1875, the federal courts turned to these
state equity precedents to wield injunctions against government
overreach. 144
Pfander and Wentzel correctly reproach the national government injunction’s critics for equitable originalism, for looking
too narrowly for support only on the equity side, and for overlooking the permeability between state and federal courts as
well as between legal and equitable remedies. “A jurisprudence
of constitutional remedies that measures the legitimate scope of
modern federal equity by looking to the practices of the High
Court of Chancery, circa 1789, will,” they wrote, “capture only a
partial view of the remedies available to suitors in the early republic.” 145
The difficult contemporary decision for equity jurisdiction
and subject matter jurisdiction is Justice Scalia’s 1999 majority
opinion in Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond

141. See 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (2018) (noting that mandamus empowers federal
courts to compel certain government officials and agencies “to perform a duty owed
to the plaintiff”).
142. Pfander & Wentzel, supra note 105 (manuscript at 4 n.13).
143. Id. (manuscript at 33).
144. Pfander and Wentzel use this history to reach Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908), where the Supreme Court approved a federal injunction that forbade a state
attorney general from enforcing an unconstitutional state statute and contempt for
its violation. See generally Pfander & Wentzel, supra note 105.
145. Pfander & Wentzel, supra note 105 (manuscript at 10–11).
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Fund, Inc. 146 The Court’s divided decision held that in a general
creditor’s transitory contract action to recover a debt of money
damages, the federal district court could not grant the creditorplaintiff an asset-freezing injunction against its debtor. An asset-freezing injunction is an interlocutory injunction that bars a
defendant from thwarting the plaintiff’s later efforts to collect a
money judgment. A federal district court could grant a plaintiff
an asset-freezing injunction only if a statute allowed one or if the
plaintiff demanded an equitable remedy but not monetary
damages. 147
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion sought “an authority to administer in equity suits the principles of the system of judicial
remedies which had been devised and was being administered
by the English Court of Chancery at the time of the separation
of the two countries.” 148 It went on to hold that “[b]ecause such
a remedy was historically unavailable from a court of equity, we
hold that the District Court had no authority to issue a preliminary injunction preventing [defendants] from disposing of their
assets pending adjudication of [plaintiffs’] contract claim for
money damages.” 149
If equity jurisdiction included only those remedies administered by the English Court of Chancery at the time of the separation of the two countries, then this static originalism and plain
meaning is classic Scalia. He misses the merger of law and equity as well as the rise of the injunction. He seems, however, to
pass over the question of whether equity jurisdiction is jurisdictional. He overlooks the traditional distinction between, on one
hand, absence of power or subject matter jurisdiction which
leads to voidness and, on the other, equity jurisdiction and mistaken use of power which leads to erroneousness.
Alliance Bond Fund lacks the hallmarks of subject matter
jurisdiction. An asset-freezing injunction is not forbidden; it is
available when the plaintiff sues for an equitable remedy or un146. 527 U.S. 308 (1999). This draws on the treatment in Chapter 7 of DOUG
RENDLEMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: INJUNCTIONS, STRUCTURAL REMEDIES, AND
CONTEMPT 895 (2010), that emphasizes the decision’s international and debtorcreditor features. See also Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet:
Tradition, History, and Limitations on Federal Judicial Power—A Case Study, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291 (2000).
147. See Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. at 326–27 (noting that the Judiciary Act
of 1789 did not give courts the power to grant the relief sought by respondents).
148. Id. at 318 (quoting Atlas Life Ins. v. W.I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568
(1939)).
149. Id. at 333.
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der a statute. An asset-freezing injunction is a serious innovation. It is usually interlocutory based on incomplete procedure.
It is disconnected from the merits—a money judgment. Its closest relative is pre-judgment attachment.
As we will see below, the judge may grant a nationwide national government injunction to an injunction class. This availability of a national government injunction militates against the
idea that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction or equitable
jurisdiction to grant one in a non-class action. Chafee’s tiebreaker between voidness and error is equity jurisdiction: “In
cases of doubt, it is wise to let the rule in question operate merely
as a principle of right decision like most other judge-made and
statutory rules.” 150
In her Alliance Bond Fund dissent, Justice Ginsburg was
wiser about equity jurisdiction. She wrote that the principles of
equity include the more general principle that the Court is able
to grant an injunction when the plaintiff’s remedy at law is inadequate. “[T]he Court,” she wrote, “relies on an unjustifiably
static conception of equity jurisdiction.” 151 Equitable relief may
only be limited by statute. Equity is flexible; it evolves over
time. 152 The merger of law and equity as well as other developments mean that a contemporary plaintiff may seek an injunction and damages in a single lawsuit. Because equity grows with
the changing times, Justice Ginsburg argued, the Court has equity jurisdiction to grant an appropriate plaintiff an assetfreezing injunction. 153 With respect, Justice Ginsburg’s view is
better than Justice Scalia’s because it is soundly based in history
and policy.
Justice Ginsburg is not the only jurist to espouse that idea.
“If the law is to survive and flourish,” the late Judge Patricia
Wald said in a speech,

150. CHAFEE, supra note 108, at 311.
151. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. at 336 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also
Pfander & Wentzel, supra note 105 (manuscript at 8) (“More troubling yet, [the
critics] may deprive equity of its characteristic ability to adapt to changes in the
remedial system as a whole.”).
152. See Frost, supra note 9, at 1084. Frost subscribes to Justice Ginsburg’s view
of equity jurisdiction but does not footnote Justice Ginsburg’s idea that equity
evolves to solve new problems.
153. But Justice Ginsburg goes too far in approving the asset-freezing injunction
on appeal; the debtor’s preference shouldn’t be enough to qualify the creditor for an
asset-freezing injunction. See David Capper, The Need for Mareva Injunctions
Reconsidered, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2161, 2172 (2005).

RENDLEMAN_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

924

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

4/17/2020 5:12 PM

[Vol. 91

it must change and develop through experience, application
to new situations, testing in new circumstances, infusion of
new knowledge. Today, it seems, we shy from that philosophy
for fear it may draw the stigma of “legal activism.” But labels
are deceiving and too often intimidating. The truth is that life
does change and the law must adapt to that inevitability. 154

Lack of standing may be a defect in subject matter jurisdiction. Critics of nationwide national government injunctions combine questions about plaintiffs’ standing with jurisdiction.155
Professor Frost responds correctly, in my view, that standing defines entry—the threshold of litigation—but not remedy. After
deciding for the plaintiff on the merits, the appropriate remedy
will be determined by the judge. 156 To seek an injunction, a
plaintiff must have both “remedial standing” and injury. Remedial standing stems from the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons. 157 Lyons sued the City and sought
an injunction; he claimed that a police officer’s use of a choke
hold on him was unconstitutional misconduct. The Court held
that, while Lyons might have standing to recover damages for
his past injury, he lacked standing to sue for an injunction to bar
the future use of choke holds by L.A. police officers unless he
could show that he was threatened with a choke hold in the
future. 158
While plaintiffs must, at the beginning of a lawsuit, assert
their own interests and have standing to seek an injunction, at
the end of the lawsuit the judge has equitable discretion to define the breadth and extent of injunctive relief. In Martin v.
154. Adam Bernstein, Patricia Wald, Pathbreaking Federal Judge Who Became
Chief of D.C. Circuit, Dies at 90, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2019, 10:10 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/obituaries/patricia-wald-pathbreaking-federaljudge-who-became-chief-of-dc-circuit-dies-at-90/2019/01/12/6ab03904-1688-11e9803c-4ef28312c8b9 [https:// https://perma.cc/KS3S-8ELH]; see also Capper, supra
note 153, at 2169–70 (“[Justice Scalia] envisages an inordinately narrow ability for
courts of equity to mold the remedies they grant over time to meet changing
circumstances.”).
155. Bray, supra note 11; Michael T. Morley, De Facto Class Actions? Plaintiffand Defendant-Oriented Injunctions in Voting Rights, Election Law, and Other
Constitutional Cases, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487 (2016); Morley, supra note
11.
156. Frost, supra note 9, at 1083; see also Alan M. Trammell, The
Constitutionality of Nationwide Injunctions, 91 U. COLO. L. REV. 977, 979–84
(2020).
157. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
158. Id. at 111; see also Trammell, supra note 156, at 979–84.
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Franklin Capital Corp., Chief Justice Roberts wrote: “Discretion
is not whim, and limiting discretion according to legal standards
helps promote the basic principle of justice that like cases should
be decided alike.” 159
At that stage, the judge’s remedial power may extend beyond the plaintiffs’ complete relief without encroaching on Article III’s case or controversy prerequisite. Trammell gives the example of broad, future-oriented structural injunctions. 160 The
argument that nonparties lack standing either to seek or to benefit from a nationwide injunction is unsuccessful when plaintiffs
have standing at the beginning of their lawsuits.
State attorneys general have been regular proponents of nationwide national government injunctions. Their “standing” has
been controversial. 161 Scholars have argued in favor of a presumption that the Constitution and statutes protect individual,
not state, interests. 162
To begin, state attorneys general suing to curb federal executive lawbreaking illustrate federalism’s system of checks and
balances. 163 They bring resources, expertise, and depth to oppose formidable federal lawyers. 164 In addition to federal
lawbreaking’s effect on the state governments themselves, the
attorneys general are in parens patraie relationships to their
constituents. 165 Professor Crocker said that state government
standing is analogous to organizational standing and is even
easier to sustain. 166
159. 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005).
160. Trammell, supra note 9, at 84–89, n.108.
161. See Symposium, Federal Courts, Practice, and Procedure: State Standing,
94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1883 (2019); Grove, supra note 92.
162. Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Reining in State Standing, 94
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2015 (2019).
163. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); Bradford Mank &
Michael E. Solimine, State Standing and National Injunctions, 94 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1955 (2019). Fred Barbash, Litigation Against Executive Branch by Coalitions
of States Grows in Response to Unilateral Actions by President and Gridlocked
Congress, WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2019, 10:10 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/national-security/litigation-against-executive-branch-by-coalitions-of-statesgrows-in-response-to-unilateral-actions-by-president-and-gridlocked-congress
/2019/08/24/34267560-c5bf-11e9-b72f-b31dfaa77212
[https://perma.cc/9VFCZLXF].
164. F. Andrew Hessick & William P. Marshall, State Standing to Constrain the
President, 21 CHAP. L. REV. 83, 97 (2018); Mank & Solimine, supra note 163.
165. Hessick & Marshall, supra note 164, at 105 (arguing to relax injury in fact);
Mank & Solimine, supra note 163.
166. Katherine Mims Crocker, An Organizational Account of State Standing, 94
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2057 (2019).
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The scope of an injunction is a matter of equity jurisdiction,
not subject matter jurisdiction; it hinges on the judge’s exercise
of discretion in light of the principles of sound decision-making.
An injunction that is too broad is erroneous, not void.
3. The Rise of the Injunction
When the twentieth century started, the federal courts’ injunctions were a conservative tool. These anti-progressive injunctions against state regulation gave the injunction a bad
name. In Ex parte Young, for example, a federal judge held the
Minnesota attorney general in contempt for suing to enforce a
Minnesota maximum rate statute. 167 In the late 1930s, the New
Deal Court circumscribed the Lochner-era decisions that struck
down state regulatory statutes on substantive due process
grounds. 168 In addition, the federal courts’ injunctions against
labor strikes were a scandal. Congress passed the NorrisLaGuardia Act to curb federal strike injunctions. 169 The courts’
conservatism waned during the first half of the century.
Several developments boosted the injunction to become the
courts’ major equitable remedy. Law and equity were merged;
plaintiffs could seek both legal damages and an equitable injunction in a single lawsuit. Another development was the decline of
the maxim that “equity protects only property rights” which, for
one thing, circumscribed the Chancellor’s ability to protect
plaintiffs’ personal or constitutional rights. 170 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court made a telling argument against
this maxim in Kenyon v. City of Chicopee. 171 Jehovah’s Witnesses sued to enjoin local authorities’ harassment through
criminal prosecutions. The authorities argued that a court could
grant an injunction to protect the plaintiffs’ “property rights” to
conduct a business, but it could not grant an injunction to protect
their “personal rights,” such as free speech and free exercise of
religion. “We are impressed,” the court said, “by the plaintiffs’
167. 209 U.S. 123, 141 (1908).
168. FELDMAN, supra note 39, at 103–26; DAVID KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM
FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1924–1945, at 334–37
(1999); JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME
COURT 429–35, 444–56, 518–24 (2010).
169. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–110 (2018) (barring federal injunctions against strikes
except in limited circumstances).
170. OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 1–9 (1978).
171. 70 N.E.2d 241, 244 (Mass. 1946).
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suggestion that if equity would safeguard their right to sell bananas it ought to be at least equally solicitous of their personal
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution.” 172 Present-day state
and federal courts grant plaintiffs injunctions to protect many
kinds of “personal” rights.
The earlier approach was that an equity court would not resolve disputes of a “peculiarly political nature” because they
were more properly resolved by legislative or executive
action. 173 But in 1962, the Supreme Court held that apportionment of congressional districts was justiciable. 174 And presentday courts adjudicate many “political” disputes, including
nationwide national government injunctions. 175
Two other examples show reclassification of equitable jurisdiction. First, earlier equity courts claimed lack of equitable jurisdiction to award punitive damages. After law and equity
merged, the New York Court of Appeals, drawing on the whole
body of merged law and equity, approved an injunction alongside
punitive damages. 176 Second, other earlier equity courts claimed
that equity lacked jurisdiction to enjoin libel. After the merger,
the court has jurisdiction which may not be exercised under the
maxim that “equity will not enjoin a libel.” 177
The Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education struck down legalized school segregation and gave the injunction a special prominence and new moral legitimacy. 178 The
decades-long process of federal courts actually issuing injunctions to desegregate public schools developed courts’ self-confidence and expertise. 179
Other parallel changes in the broader world of government
and policy fueled the development of the national government
injunction. These changes included consolidation of the Presi172. Id.
173. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946).
174. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
175. But see Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019) (holding that
partisan gerrymandering is a political question and not justiciable).
176. I.H.P. Corp. v. 210 Cent. Park S. Corp., 189 N.E.2d 812 (N.Y. 1963); see also
DOUG RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 399–
400 (9th ed. 2018).
177. Organovo Holdings v. Dimitrov, 162 A.3d 102, 115 (Del. Ch. 2017) (quoting
Am. Malting Co. v. Keitel, 209 F. 351, 356 (2d Cir. 1913)).
178. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I).
179. Doug Rendleman, Brown II’s “All Deliberate Speed” at Fifty: A Golden
Anniversary or a Mid-Life Crisis for the Constitutional Injunction as a School
Desegregation Remedy?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV 1575 (2004).
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dent’s power at the expense of Congress and the rise of the activist federal executive. They are examined above in this
Article. 180
4. The Structural Injunction and the National
Government Injunction
Support for the federal courts’ authority to grant national
government injunctions is also shown by the widespread use of
structural injunctions, which are close relatives of the national
government injunction. Comparing the structural injunction to
the national government injunction supplies background and
perspective.
Structural injunctions are remedies in injunction class actions, usually on behalf of a racial or other minority group.
Structural-injunction plaintiffs usually accuse a state or local
government defendant of violating the Constitution or a federal
statute. A few years ago, when I wrote my article on future remedies in constitutional litigation, 181 the defendants in structural
injunction litigation were state and local government officials.
Although the official is the named defendant, the government
institution is the functional defendant. Beginning with schools,
mental hospitals, prisons, police departments, and law enforcement, federal judges enjoined state and local officials to bring
the institutions into compliance with, usually, the Constitution
and federal statutes. 182
Today, the need to curb illegal and unconstitutional government activity means including the federal government as a defendant and demanding the remedy of a national government
injunction instead of a structural injunction. Like a structural
injunction, a national government injunction forbids a federalofficial defendant from pursuing a policy that violates the Constitution or a federal statute, although under a national government injunction the official defendant is a federal government
agent rather than a state government agent.
Plaintiffs differ in structural injunctions and national government injunctions. In contrast to its role as the defendant in
national government injunctions, the federal executive has par180. KRUSE & ZELIZER, supra note 45.
181. Rendleman, supra note 50.
182. FISS, supra note 170, at 1–9; see also Trammell, supra note 156, at 988–96
(providing a structural injunction background for nationwide injunctions).
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ticipated on the plaintiff side in structural injunction
litigation. 183 In this litigation, the federal executive has managed many negotiations leading to consent decrees. 184
In both structural injunctions and national government injunctions, the plaintiff asks the court to curb or reorganize a government institution to achieve compliance with the law. Both
the federal and the state government switch sides in national
government injunctions: the federal executive is the defendant
and the plaintiffs often include state attorneys general.
The first stage in a structural injunction lawsuit is deciding
the defendant’s liability by determining whether the defendant
is violating the substantive law. In a lawsuit resulting in a national government injunction, the judge’s finding that the federal defendant violated the Constitution or a statute is
equivalent to the liability stage in a structural injunction.
At the next stage, the judge crafts a remedy that is negative
and preventive: the official defendant’s violations must stop. The
injunction resembles a personalized statute that forbids the defendant’s misconduct. A structural injunction then requires the
parties and the judge to look to the future to rebuild an institution that has gone legally astray. In Professor Owen Fiss’s
words, a structural injunction “seeks to effectuate the reorganization of an ongoing social institution.” 185 Since structural injunction lawsuits are usually brought against state or local
officials, the injunction is not nationwide but statewide or local.
A national government injunction has the same negative,
preventive feature; it protects plaintiffs’ important statutory or
constitutional rights by forbidding the government from pursuing an illegal policy. A national government injunction makes
explicit what is implicit in rule of law principles—that the government must follow its own constitutional and statutory rules.
Correcting the injustice—cleaning up the mess—to protect
plaintiffs’ rights and stop the illegal behavior may require a national government injunction to restructure an institution. An
183. See, e.g., Ayres v. Thompson, 358 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2004).
184. This has included consent decrees with big-city police departments.
Attorney General Sessions later withdrew from these consent decrees. See Wesley
Lowery & Matt Zapotosky, Democrats Demand Documents on Justice Dept. Police
Reform Efforts Under Trump, WASH. POST (May 14, 2019, 2:55 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/democrats-demand-documentson-justice-dept-police-reform-efforts-under-trump/2019/05/14/a12f0baa-7654-11e9b7ae-390de4259661 [https://perma.cc/K7WF-8LB3].
185. FISS, supra note 170, at 7.
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example of this is the judicial efforts to reunite families separated under the Trump Administration’s zero-tolerance, familyseparation policies which, at this writing, are well into their second year. 186
Two streams of analysis of the structural injunction coexist.
One debates the structural injunction’s legitimacy; it sets critics’
arguments based on federalism and separation of powers
against proponents’ responses based on plaintiffs’ constitutional
rights and defendants’ obedience to the law. 187 A second stream
discusses the injunction class action’s technical features, including the idea that, even though a plaintiff class member receives
no formal notice of the lawsuit, she will be precluded from relitigating a judgment for the defendant. 188
In the meantime, structural injunction litigation to protect
plaintiff classes’ constitutional and statutory rights has moved
forward, a servile drudge almost oblivious to the debates. First,
the structural injunction lost its unitary nature and developed
in separate, special substantive categories: education, prisons
and jails, mental hospitals, etc. Second, the parties and the
judges developed a practice of negotiation, leading to sometimescomplex consent decrees.
Actual structural injunction litigation in trial courts flies
under professors’ appellate-based radar and ignores the debates
over legitimacy and preclusion. It is usually out of sight, except
when the parties ask the judge to approve a specialized and detailed negotiated consent decree. 189 Many structural injunctions
have lasted for decades. 190 Consent decrees are contested by defendants’ motions to modify or dissolve. 191

186.
187.

See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
For a collection of the literature, see OWEN M FISS & DOUG RENDLEMAN,
INJUNCTIONS 827–30 (1984).
188. David Marcus, Flawed But Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its
Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 658 (2011).
189. National Digest: Judge Agrees to Plan for Court Supervised Changes to
Chicago Police, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2019, 4:12 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-digest-judge-agrees-to-plan-for-courtsupervised-changes-to-chicago-police/2019/01/31/71bfbb9c-2057-11e9-8b590a28f2191131 [https://perma.cc/4367-95NF].
190. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 372–74 (1992);
Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 268–69 (1990); Ayres v. Thompson, 358
F.3d 356, 359–61 (5th Cir. 2004).
191. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,
502 U.S. at 381–82.
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The structural injunction has faced criticism on two major
grounds: federalism and separation of powers. Critics charge
that federal judges use injunctions to order state and local governments around. A judge formulating, drafting, and implementing a structural injunction is performing legislative and
executive functions in developing a government program.
A national government injunction—granted by a federal
judge against a federal executive defendant—avoids the federalism concerns found in structural injunctions. But the national
government injunction makes up for the lack of federalism concerns with increased tension from its strain on separation of
powers. Stalwart defenders of legislative and executive power
are offended by federal judges’ orders bringing federal institutions into compliance.
Like a structural injunction, a national government injunction is complex and can take a long time to implement. The judge
may fall back on gradualism, incremental implementation of the
plaintiffs’ rights, Brown II’s “all deliberate speed,” and trusting
the local authorities. 192
Although controversial, national government injunctions
and structural injunctions are necessary remedial tools for
courts to grant plaintiffs relief and to curb illegal, perhaps unconstitutional, federal and state government activity.
5. Enforcement, Including Contempt
This Article continues to compare structural injunctions
and national government injunctions with a discussion of enforcement.
Like structural injunctions, “severe sanctions are unlikely”
in national government injunctions. 193 The national
government injunction, like the structural injunction, goes easy
on the defendant. In addition to the direct expense of
compliance, the defendant’s costs of structural litigation are the
opprobrium of being sued for violating plaintiffs’ rights and being required to defend.
In an ideal world, an injunction would be unnecessary. Rule
of law principles, precedent, or a declaratory judgment would
suffice to bring the defendant into compliance. If precedent suf192.
193.

Rendleman, supra note 179, at 1585–87.
FISS, supra note 170, at 13.
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fices, there is no need for a class action or an injunction.194
“Where a question of law is decisive . . . the concept of stare decisis furnishes almost the same advantages as a class action. . . .
[A] decision on the law effectively binds non-parties without upsetting our assurance that due process has been done . . . .”195
The government would obey the apparent law as stated by the
judge, an official with power to decide. However, the nation’s experience with Massive Resistance to school desegregation proves
that “faith in precedent as a remedy is touching but perhaps naive.” 196
A declaratory judgment is a court’s judgment that articulates the law and tells the parties what their rights and obligations are. 197 Because a declaratory judgment is not an order,
defendants cannot be held in contempt for violating it. The injunction, which can be enforced through contempt proceedings,
is the more effective remedy in most serious lawsuits. But as this
Article will examine, judges do not employ harsh contempt sanctions in lawsuits against the federal executive.
Rule of law principles depend on defendants’ obedience to
court orders and acceptance of judicial legitimacy. 198 In early
civil rights actions against state and local officials “a single generalization emerge[d]: courts hesitate to use contempt against
government officials.” 199 Sometimes defendants’ disobedience
made contempt possible, but the disobedience was overlooked. 200 Both civil and criminal contempt occurred. 201 Apart
from contempt, a federal military presence accompanied desegregation of Ole Miss and the Little Rock schools. 202 The single
recent contempt finding against a local official was the Kentucky

194. Rendleman, supra note 50, at 156 n.2.
195. Jack B. Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions,
9 BUFF. L. REV. 433, 446 (1960).
196. Rendleman, supra note 50, at 160; see also Rendleman, supra note 179, at
1609.
197. Rendleman, supra note 50, at 161–62. Roe v. Wade, one of the Supreme
Court’s most contentious and controversial decisions, was a declaratory judgment.
410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973).
198. Driesen, supra note 79, at 515.
199. Rendleman, supra note 50, at 169; see also Parrillo, supra note 93, at 702.
200. Rendleman, supra note 50, at 168 n.81.
201. Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., 363 F.2d 206 (4th Cir. 1966);
In re Herndon, 325 F. Supp. 779 (M.D. Ala. 1971); Halderman v. Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp., 526 F. Supp. 423, 427 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
202. JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945–
1974, at 414–16, 477–78 (1996); Parrillo, supra note 93, at 741.
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judge’s jailing of Kim Davis to coerce her to issue a marriage license to a same-sex couple. 203
The federal courts are easier on disobedient federal defendants than they are on state defendants. 204 And, normally, federal defendants obey court orders, 205 in part because the Justice
Department’s credibility with the federal courts depends on the
government’s obedience to court orders. 206
Professor Parrillo’s complex and nuanced study of federal
courts’ enforcement of injunctions against federal defendants
concludes:
First, the federal judiciary is willing to issue contempt findings against federal agencies and officials. Second, while several individual federal judges believe they can (and have tried
to) attach sanctions to these findings, the judiciary as an institution—particularly the higher courts—has exhibited a
virtually complete unwillingness to allow sanctions, at times
intervening dramatically to block imprisonment or budgetstraining fines at the eleventh hour. Third, the higher courts,
even as they unfailingly halt sanctions in all but a few minor
instances, have bent over backward to avoid making authoritative pronouncements that sanctions are categorically unavailable, thus keeping the sanctions issue in a state of low
salience and at least nominal legal uncertainty. Fourth, even
though contempt findings are practically devoid of sanctions,
they nonetheless have a shaming effect that gives them substantial if imperfect deterrent power. The efficacy of judicial
review of agency action rests primarily on a strong norm,
shared in the overlapping communities that agency officials
inhabit, that officials comply with court orders. Shame-inducing contempt findings by judges are the means to weaponize
that norm. 207

203. Parrillo, supra note 93, at 741.
204. Id. at 702.
205. Grove, supra note 92 (noting that compliance norm grew out of the civil
rights experience).
206. Id.
207. Parrillo, supra note 93, at 697. Compliance issues and measures after
judicial voiding of federal agency measures include negotiations, drafting
injunctions, scheduling compliance, defendants’ claims of difficulty and requests for
delay, discovery to gather information (including depositions), proceedings to test
agency good faith and agency reputational concerns, and finally, appellate courts’
reluctance to approve stern measures and contempt. See Nicholas R. Parrillo,
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Federal court experience with contempt for violation of a national government injunction is limited. In Grace v. Sessions,
when the government deported a likely beneficiary of the national government injunction, Judge Sullivan threatened contempt: return Carmen or show cause against contempt. 208
As the editing process for this Article was in its final stages,
federal Magistrate Judge Kim held the Secretary of Education,
Betsy DeVos, in contempt for violating a preliminary injunction
that required the Department of Education to stop collecting student loans from defrauded students who had borrowed to attend
a defunct, for-profit “college.” Magistrate Judge Kim’s $100,000
compensatory contempt sanction will be used to repay the defrauded students for loan-servicing companies’ wage garnishment and tax refund interceptions in violation of the order.209
This use of compensatory contempt shows that federal courts
know how to deal with a cabinet official’s violation of an order.
That a magistrate judge without life tenure or salary protection
sanctioned a breaching cabinet officer in contempt should inform
executive branch officials that the judicial branch means business and has the last word.
In January 2020, in Baez-Sanchez v. Barr, Judge Frank
Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit reprobated the Justice Department for ignoring the earlier remand order and referring to
the earlier panel order as incorrect: “What happened next beggars belief.” 210 Judge Easterbrook continued:
We have never before encountered defiance of a remand order, and we hope never to see it again. Members of the Board
must count themselves lucky that Baez-Sanchez has not
asked us to hold them in contempt, with all the consequences
that possibility entails.

Negotiating the Federal Government’s Compliance with Court Orders: An Initial
Exploration, 97 N.C. L. REV. 899 (2019).
207. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2018).
208. No. 18-cv-1853 (EGS), 2018 WL 3812445, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 2018)
(internal quotations omitted).
209. Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Federal Judge Holds DeVos in Contempt in Loan
Case, Slaps Education Department with $100,000 Fine, WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2019,
9:16 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2019/10/24/federal-judgeholds-devos-contempt-loan-case-slaps-education-dept-with-/
[https://perma.cc
/DGB9-P7BS].
210. 947 F.3d 1033, 1035 (7th Cir. 2020).
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The Board seemed to think that we had issued an advisory
opinion, and that faced with a conflict between our views and
those of the Attorney General it should follow the latter. 211

The panel upheld the immigration judge’s order and directed the
government to obey. 212 The Seventh Circuit’s strong resolve and
explicit language shows the judiciary’s commitment to compliance, even by the federal government.
Similarly, a Kentucky federal district judge’s willingness to
jail local government official Kim Davis for refusing to comply
with an order to issue a marriage license to a same-sex couple
also demonstrates federal courts’ resolve to implement the Constitution and to ensure compliance with court orders. 213
Although the contempt litigation in Nevada v. United States
Department of Labor is complex, lengthy, and cryptic, it may be
an important precedent for holding the federal government in
contempt for violating nationwide injunctions. 214 States sued
the U.S. Department of Labor in Texas to enjoin an Obama Administration overtime rule. The Texas federal district judge
granted a nationwide national government injunction forbidding
implementation of the rule. 215 A private plaintiff, Alvarez, filed
a separate lawsuit in New Jersey for overtime under the rule.
The Texas judge—using the “privity” concept from preclusion,
not Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2)—found privity between the New Jersey plaintiff, Alvarez, and the Texas
defendants; based on that finding, the court held Alvarez in contempt. 216 The Fifth Circuit reversed Alvarez’s nonparty
contempt; the court held that there was neither privity nor Rule
65(d)(2) active concert or participation between Alvarez and the
defendant government department. 217 Although the Fifth Circuit would have been wiser to decide the case under Rule 65(d)(2)
without mentioning privity, its decision is important because the
trial judge’s contempt order against a nonparty almost converted
211. Id. at 1035–36.
212. Id. at 1035–37.
213. Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924, 929, 944 (E.D. Ky. 2015), appeal
dismissed and remanded, 2015 WL 9460311, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 23, 2015).
214. Nevada v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 275 F. Supp. 3d 795 (E.D. Tex.
2017); Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 218 F. Supp. 3d 520 (E.D. Tex. 2016).
215. Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 534; Nevada v. United
States Dep’t of Labor, 275 F. Supp. 3d 795.
216. Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 321 F. Supp. 3d 709, 724 (E.D. Tex. 2018),
rev’d sub nom. Texas v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 929 F.3d 205 (5th Cir. 2019).
217. Texas v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 929 F.3d at 214.
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the injunction against the federal government into a statute that
affected everyone in the United States. The Fifth Circuit’s correct decision limits contempt of a nationwide national injunction
to the named defendant, agents, and others who are nonparties
in active concert or participation with them. 218
In litigation against a state or federal government program
with an uncooperative defendant, judges seldom resort to coercive or punitive contempt techniques, but they keep these
enforcement techniques in reserve to threaten, brandish, or employ only as a last resort.
6. Equitable Jurisdiction and Judicial Discretion
“O, it is excellent / to have a giant’s strength; but it is tyrannous / To use it like a giant,” 219 Isabella says in Measure for
Measure. Following that advice, a court with jurisdiction should
not always exercise it. The judge with broad subject matter jurisdiction to grant an injunction should exercise self-restraint
and be careful about when and how to exercise that power. 220
The national government injunction falls under equitable
jurisdiction and principles of judicial decision-making, equitable
discretion, and action. What are those principles?
Whether to grant a nationwide national government injunction is not a choice between remedies; 221 it is a choice of scope of
remedy. Whether a judge should grant a nationwide injunction
or a more limited injunction is within the judge’s equitable discretion about how to draft and measure the remedy chosen, specifically the narrowness or breadth of the injunction. The judge
who has already found that the government broke the law and
that some kind of injunction is warranted will decide between
issuing an injunction against only the federal official involved in
the case or a broader injunction against all officials nationwide.
Measurement-of-remedy decisions are more contextual and discretionary than choice-of-remedy decisions. 222

218. Rendleman, supra note 65, at 878–80 (criticizing privity); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 63 (AM. LAW INST. 1982) (discussing preclusion-res
judicata and obedience to an injunction).
219. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE act 2, sc. 2.
220. Douglas, supra note 70, at 34–35, 54–56.
221. Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 873 (N.Y. 1970).
222. Doug Rendleman, The Triumph of Equity Revisited: The Stages of Equitable
Discretion, 15 NEV. L.J. 1397, 1426–31, 1434–38 (2015).
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Professor Chafee discussed disfavored forms of relief. He
used the example of an appellate court’s decision to deny equity
jurisdiction to hold that a trial judge’s temporary, mandatory injunction that shifted possession was void. Such an injunction,
Chafee argued, may be erroneous, but it is not void. 223 An incorrect national government injunction is a form of relief that falls
under Chafee’s classification of a decision that is erroneous but
not void. Equitable jurisdiction is not truly jurisdictional: federal
courts have subject matter jurisdiction to grant a winning plaintiff a broad, nationwide national government injunction.
Granting such an injunction involves principles of correct
decision-making, balancing, and weighing.
The Trump Administration seeks to end the nationwide national government injunctions that have enjoined many of the
President’s policies. 224 These efforts have so far failed. Even
courts that are skeptical of nationwide national government injunctions have rejected the government’s “anti-nationwide
injunctions” argument. For example, in limiting a nationwide injunction to its circuit, the Ninth Circuit in East Bay Sanctuary
Covenant noted: “We have upheld nationwide injunctions where
such breadth was necessary to remedy a plaintiff’s harm.”225
The policy of providing relief to successful plaintiffs has prevailed over arguments against broad injunctions.
Having established the federal courts’ authority or equitable jurisdiction to grant a nationwide national government
injunction under principles of confinement, this Article next responds to critics’ other reasons to oppose national government
injunctions.
B. Forum Shopping
Critics claim that nationwide national government injunctions encourage forum shopping. 226 Forum shopping occurs
when a plaintiff chooses to sue in one court instead of another
and hopes that the selected court will treat its case more favorably than the rejected court would have. Whether forum
223. CHAFEE, supra note 108, at 349.
224. See Sessions Memorandum on Nationwide Injunctions, supra note 12.
225. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 934 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2019)
(citing California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 582 (9th Cir. 2018)).
226. See Bray, supra note 11; Cass, supra note 11; Morley, supra note 11;
Wasserman, supra note 10, at 616; Sessions Memorandum on Nationwide
Injunctions, supra note 12.
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shopping is an abuse or an integral part of the adversary system
is a controversial issue.
The Supreme Court wrote that “[j]urisdiction and venue requirements are often easily satisfied. As a result, many plaintiffs
are able to choose among several forums.” 227 In addition to the
jurisdiction-venue system, a lawyer has a duty to her client to
select a beneficial forum. The choice of forum is often one of the
plaintiff’s most important tactical decisions in a lawsuit. 228
The law gives litigants vertical and horizontal choices of forum. For a vertical example, a plaintiff suing a defendant from
a different state may choose between state court general jurisdiction and federal court diversity jurisdiction. Federal diversity
jurisdiction is based on forum shopping. A litigant who considers
a federal court to be a more hospitable forum can choose that
court. 229 An out-of-state defendant in a state court may choose
federal jurisdiction by removal. 230
A plaintiff has horizontal choices among states because personal jurisdiction and venue over the defendant are possible in
several states. The broad federal venue statute means that a
plaintiff can sue a federal executive official or the President almost anywhere in the United States. 231 The plaintiff’s forum
choice is entitled to paramount consideration. 232
There are arguments for discouraging litigant forum shopping. Personal jurisdiction may be limited. 233 Venue statutes,
state long-arm statutes, and the forum non conveniens doctrine
may also circumscribe plaintiffs’ choices. 234 But within those
broad limits, plaintiffs deciding where to file their lawsuits enjoy
many options. 235
A lot of federal law is under the concurrent jurisdiction of
state and federal courts, but national government injunction litigation “arises under” federal law. Plaintiffs sue in federal court
227. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 250 (1981).
228. Pamela K. Bookman, The Unsung Virtues of Global Forum Shopping, 92
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, 583 (2016).
229. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1441 (2018).
230. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2018).
231. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1) (2018); 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (permitting a federal officer
sued in state court to remove to federal court); Kate Huddleston, Nationwide
Injunctions: Venue Considerations, 127 YALE L.J. F. 242 (2017).
232. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 250 (1981).
233. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017).
234. STEPHEN YEAZELL & JOANNA SCHWARTZ, CIVIL PROCEDURE 177–202 (10th
ed. 2019).
235. Id. at 266.
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because of federal question jurisdiction and the removal statute.
Plaintiffs have a broad choice of federal venue. A plaintiff suing
a federal executive defendant and seeking a national government injunction cannot change the federal substantive law or
federal procedure, but the plaintiff can select the district, division, and, sometimes, the district court judge. In volatile and
controversial national government injunction litigation, the
judge makes a difference.
Plaintiffs suing to upset an improper federal policy by seeking a national government injunction will choose as favorable a
forum as they can. 236 A wide selection of states, and perhaps
judges, is possible if several state attorneys general band together as plaintiffs.
This reality of modern jurisdiction and venue rules is not a
reason to forbid judges from granting a national government injunction. A plaintiff’s selection of a favorable trial judge may,
however, militate against the idea that the judge will take precautions against disfavoring the defendant.
C. Conflicting Injunctions
Professor Lon Fuller argued that courts cannot handle
amorphous “polycentric” disputes. 237 If this argument was ever
persuasive, however, time has since passed it by. In addition to
resolving individual disputes, courts also refine, develop, and
create law. 238 The minimalist view of litigation as merely dispute resolution has been subordinated to the historically and
theoretically correct view that courts articulate public values
and advance public goals in public law litigation. 239 The late
236. See, e.g., Manny Fernandez, In Weaponized Courts, Judge Who Halted
Affordable Care Act Is a Conservative Favorite, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/12/15/us/judge-obamacare-reed-oconnor.html
[https://
perma.cc/HPR2-6E2Y].
237. Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353,
394–404 (1978).
238. PAUL D. CARRINGTON, DANIEL J. MEADOR, & MAURICE ROSENBERG,
JUSTICE ON APPEAL 2–3 (1976); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN
LIFE (1991); see also MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW
5–6 (1988).
239. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1281, 1283–84 (1976); Owen Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1, 3 (1979); Trammell, supra note 156, at 986 (dispute-resolution model of
adjudication fails).
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Professor Abram Chayes observed that “the dominating characteristic of modern federal litigation is that lawsuits do not arise
out of disputes between private parties about private rights. Instead, the object of litigation is the vindication of constitutional
or statutory policies.” 240 School desegregation, prison conditions
litigation, class actions for injunctions and damages, and multidistrict litigation show courts handling complex polycentric
disputes.
Duplicative, confusing litigation occurs when several plaintiffs file multiple lawsuits against the same federal policy in several federal courts. Such litigation furrows critics’ brows. 241 The
federal court system cannot coordinate multiple plaintiffs seeking relief from improper executive measures. Several lawsuits
are likely. State attorneys general joining together in one lawsuit brings a measure of cooperation and uniformity to
numerous lawsuits.
Domestic litigation does not have a rule like the international doctrine of lis alibi pendens that prefers the first to file.
Lis alibi pendens, which is based in international comity, allows
a court to refuse to exercise jurisdiction when parallel litigation
is pending in another jurisdiction. 242 In the federal system, consolidation 243 and multidistrict litigation 244 are the only
possibilities. Multidistrict litigation is not a well-suited technique to consolidate fast-paced national government injunction
lawsuits against a defendant pursued by different plaintiffs in
related actions. 245
This reality creates a risk of conflicting injunctions, or an
injunction in one lawsuit and a decision for the government in a
second lawsuit. This risk is not a reason to abolish national gov240. Chayes, supra note 239 at 1284.
241. See Bray, supra note 11; Cass, supra note 11; Morley, supra note 11, at 616;
Wasserman, supra note 10; Sessions Memorandum on Nationwide Injunctions,
supra note 12.
242. Mof’Oluwawo OluwaPelumi MojolaOluwa, Private International Law and
the Doctrine of Lis Alibi Pendens (2017) (unpublished manuscript).
243. FED. R. CIV. P. 42.
244. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2018).
245. Parallel litigation between the same parties is easier. A federal court may
defer to an earlier lawsuit between the same parties on the same transaction or
event in another district. The first court may enjoin the second lawsuit. The second
court may stay its later-filed lawsuit. Either court may consolidate and transfer,
usually to the first. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & MARY KAY
KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3854, at 15 (4th ed. 2019); Andrew J.
Fuller, A “Procedural Nightmare”: Dueling Courts and the Application of the FirstFiled Rule, 69 FLA. L. REV. 657 (2017).
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ernment injunctions. Rather, it is a reason to trust federal
judges’ professionalism. Careful and observant judges will exercise respect and comity for the parallel litigation.
Litigation about antisuit injunctions provides an example of
the system dealing with complexity and conflict. 246 Complexity
and parallel litigation have also emerged in national government injunction litigation. The injunctions surrounding the
Trump Administration’s policy to bar Central Americans and
other migrants from requesting asylum at the southern border
is one example of courts successfully muddling through multiple
lawsuits and conflicting orders.
A federal district court judge in Washington, D.C., Judge
Timothy J. Kelly, declined to block the policy. 247 Shortly thereafter, Judge Jon Tigar in San Francisco temporarily blocked the
policy, setting up conflicting orders and a potential race to federal appellate courts. In his decision, Judge Tigar noted that the
federal government’s frustrations with rising border crossings
did not justify “shortcutting the law” and, in reference to the opposite finding in the Washington litigation, said each judge must
render his or her own decision: “We have the appellate courts to
sort this out for us.” 248
Judge Tigar’s order prevented the policy from being carried
out until the legal issues could be fully debated. He based his
decision on Ninth Circuit precedent, which he said “consistently
recognized the authority of district courts to enjoin unlawful policies on a universal basis.” 249 He further stated that “[w]hile the
government disagrees with that ruling, it provides no contrary
authority from the immigration context and ‘no grounds on
which to distinguish this case from [the Ninth Circuit’s] uncon246. James v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., 152 N.E.2d 858, 867 (1958); see also Frost,
supra note 9, at 1105 n.173; Scott Graham, Skilled in the Art: My Injunction Can
Beat Your Injunction + FTC Says Competition is Good for 5G + My, What
Copyrightable Claws You Have, LAW.COM (July 19, 2019, 4:07 PM), https://
www.law.com/2019/07/19/skilled-in-the-art-my-injunction-can-beat-yourinjunction-ftc-says-competition-is-good-for-5g-my-what-copyrightable-claws-youhave/ [https://perma.cc/EQF6-MZGB].
247. Maria Sacchetti & Spencer Hsu, Federal Judge in California Halts Trump’s
Latest Asylum Ban, WASH. POST (July 24, 2019, 8:36 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/federal-judge-allows-trumpadministration-rule-restricting-asylum-access-to-continue/2019/07/24/eec83cfeadba-11e9-8e77-03b30bc29f64 [https://perma.cc/2K74-94ZX].
248. Id.
249. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 385 F. Supp. 3d 922, 960 (N.D.Cal.
2019) (quoting E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 909 F.3d 1219, 1255 (9th Cir.
2018)).
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troverted line of precedent.’” 250 “I’m sure [the other judge has]
given this matter as much thought as I have,” Judge Tigar
added. He later elaborated, “My point is that these are two district courts both trying to do their best work on an issue of
national importance.” 251
In the appeal following Judge Tigar’s order, the Ninth Circuit denied the government’s motion to stay the nationwide
preliminary injunction. 252 The court stated that the government
had not shown that it was likely to prevail on the merits but
noted that the trial judge had “failed to discuss whether a nationwide injunction is necessary to remedy Plaintiffs’ alleged
harm.” 253 The court stayed the trial judge’s nationwide injunction in states outside the Ninth Circuit and sent the nationwide
feature back to the district court for proof and findings of plaintiffs’ nationwide harm. 254
The dissent emphasized that national immigration law
called for uniformity: “Should asylum law be administered differently in Texas than in California?” 255 The majority
responded:
[T]he fact that injunctive relief may temporarily cause the
Rule to be administered inconsistently in different locations
is not a sound reason for imposing relief that is broader than
necessary. . . . [O]ur law requires that injunctive relief be narrowly tailored to remedy the plaintiffs’ alleged harm, and it
may only be broadened “if such breadth is necessary to give
prevailing parties the relief to which they are entitled.” 256

On remand, Judge Tigar said that “the Court grants the Organizations’ motion to restore the nationwide scope of the
250. Id. (quoting E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 909 F.3d at 1256).
251. Miriam Jordan & Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Trump’s Latest Attempt to Bar
Asylum Seekers Is Blocked After a Day of Dueling Rulings, N.Y. TIMES (July 24,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/24/us/asylum-ruling-tro.html [https://
perma.cc/2L46-2GRU]; Ross Todd, SF Judge Again Blocks Trump’s Changes to
Asylum Rules, LAW.COM (July 24, 2019, 7:32 PM), https://www.law.com
/therecorder/2019/07/24/sf-judge-again-blocks-trumps-changes-to-asylum-rules/
[https://perma.cc/M9BW-T574].
252. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 934 F.3d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019).
253. Id. at 1029.
254. Id. at 1029, 1030–31.
255. Id. at 1032 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 1030 n.8 (majority opinion) (quoting Bresgal v. Brock, 843 F.2d 1163,
1170–71 (9th Cir. 1987)) (emphasis omitted).
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injunction.” 257 Two days later, the Supreme Court stayed the nationwide injunction pending appeal. 258
Judge Tigar’s nationwide order in California affected an
identical lawsuit in the District of Columbia, where the judge
had denied the plaintiffs a temporary restraining order. 259 The
Supreme Court’s stay resolved the confusion.
Judge Tigar’s points about complexity and conflicting decisions are significant. The professional qualities of a “judicial
temperament”—which include emotional detachment, patience,
courtesy, respect, and civility—carry over to a judge’s relations
with other judges. District court judges trust and rely on other
judges’ competence and professionalism. 260 In the end, the process, the Courts of Appeals, and the Supreme Court will sort the
issues out. Complexity and potential conflict are not reasons to
limit injunction remedies.
Another solution to this problem of conflicting orders might
have been for Judge Tigar to issue an order that excluded the
judicial districts, states, or federal circuits where an inconsistent
decision or order already existed. Such an order would achieve
one goal at the expense of another, however, for it would contradict the policy of uniformity.
D. Politicized Litigation
In the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville observed, “[t]here is
hardly a political question in the United States which does not
sooner or later turn into a judicial one.” 261 Since then, the courts’
role in United States political matters has expanded. 262 Critics

257. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 391 F. Supp. 3d 974, 985 (N.D. Cal.
2019), granting stay, 140 S. Ct. 3 (2019).
258. Id. A superseding order from the Court of Appeals that emphasized
uniformity in immigration matters and complete relief had reinstated Judge Tigar’s
“universal” order. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 932 F.3d 742, 779–80 (9th
Cir. 2018).
259. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 934 F.3d at 1030 n.6.
260. Trammell, supra note 9.
261. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270 (J.P. Mayer ed. &
George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1969) (1848).
262. MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND
THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 209–10
(Alfred Blumstein & David Farrington eds., 1998).
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argue that the national government injunction politicizes litigation. 263
A plaintiff’s lawsuit against a national or state government
program has an inescapable political component because the
government established the program. 264 If the plaintiff’s lawsuit
succeeds, the political winners become the lawsuit’s losers.
When the plaintiff is a state attorney general, the addition of
another government actor increases the political quality of the
lawsuit seeking a national government injunction. A lawsuit
brought by an elected state official against the President to void
an executive order strikes the rawest political and partisan
nerves. The judge hearing such a case will know that someone
powerful and important will be upset by the decision.
The argument that the national government injunction politicizes the judiciary misses the point that a strong argument
can be made that the federal judiciary already is politicized and,
perhaps, partisan. The Robert Bork and Justice Clarence
Thomas hearings and votes were partisan. The Bush v. Gore ruling used Republican votes to award the White House to a
Republican President. 265 The Citizens United ruling advantaged
Republicans. 266 Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell refused to hold hearings on President Obama’s Supreme Court
nominee, Judge Merrick Garland, for a year. McConnell then
changed Senate voting procedure to approve President Trump’s
nominees by a simple majority. Judge Brett Kavanaugh’s nomination was a partisan appointment from beginning to end. The
Senate hearings for Judge Kavanaugh were partisan political
events conducted eight weeks before congressional elections. Finally, Judge Kavanaugh’s angry partisan attack on Democrats
in his nomination hearing and Trump’s partisan screed at Justice Kavanaugh’s swearing-in ceremony raise the question
whether appointments to the Supreme Court and the Supreme
Court itself are not only political but also partisan. 267 As a result
263. See Bray, supra note 11; Cass, supra note 11; Morley, supra note 11;
Wasserman, supra note 10; Sessions Memorandum on Nationwide Injunctions,
supra note 12.
264. BUDIANSKY, supra note 26, at 287–88.
265. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
266. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
267. Sheldon Whitehouse, Sen. Whitehouse: There’s a ‘Crisis of Credibility’ at the
U.S. Supreme Court, LAW.COM (Feb. 15, 2019, 2:50 PM), https://www.law.com
/nationallawjournal/2019/02/15/sen-whitehouse-theres-a-crisis-of-credibility-atthe-u-s-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/HUG4-CX86].
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of Trump’s appointment of Justice Kavanaugh to the Supreme
Court and the ongoing Republican partisan staffing of the lower
federal courts, the Democrats and their allies might lose their
ability to sue to upset Trump policies.
The federal district courts and federal courts of appeals are
also politicized. Newspapers writing about a judge or court decision usually identify the President who appointed the judge or
judges. 268 Careful empirical scholarship has demonstrated that
the President who appointed a judge has predictive value across
a broad spectrum of litigation. 269
Trump’s criticism of federal judges has drawn courts deeper
into the political realm. Trump called Chief Justice Roberts “an
absolute disaster.” 270 He accused a federal judge of bias because
of his family’s Mexican heritage. Chief Justice Roberts responded: “We do not have Obama judges or Trump judges, Bush
judges or Clinton judges. [. . .] What we have is an extraordinary
group of dedicated judges doing their level best to do equal right
to those appearing before them. That independent judiciary is
something we should all be thankful for.” 271 Trump responded:
“Sorry Chief Justice John Roberts, but you do indeed have
‘Obama judges,’ [. . .] and they have a much different point of
view than the people who are charged with the safety of our
country.” 272
While courts inevitably make political decisions, it is wrong
to say that courts make only political decisions. This Article accepts much of Chief Justice Roberts’ response. It is based on the
idealistic idea that United States judges are detached professionals who are devoted to the neutral rule of law. However, it is
tempered by the realism of a partisan judicial-selection process
and a system that permits plaintiffs who file where they think
they can prevail. The political lawsuit, the forum-shopped judge,

268. Shira A. Scheindlin, We Should All Defend Judges, LAW.COM (Nov. 29,
2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/11/29/we-shouldall-defend-judges/ [https://perma.cc/2BXK-K287].
269. Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Politics, Identity, and Class
Certification on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 119 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020),
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3097&context=
faculty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/L7RZ-P7CG].
270. Adam Liptak, Roberts Rebukes Trump for Swipe at ‘Obama Judge,’ N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/us/politics/trumpchief-justice-roberts-rebuke.html [https://perma.cc/4LW2-K5PA].
271. Id.
272. Id.
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and the politicized judiciary mean that a detached and collegial
appellate court ought to be available and standing by.
E. Percolation
“Percolation” expresses the idea that it is helpful for Supreme Court justices to have well-developed arguments about
the issues in the appeals they decide. This requires decisions by
several district court judges and two or three courts of appeals
to develop and clarify the issues. 273 The critics insist that one
national government injunction by one district judge shortcircuits thorough percolation of issues, complaints, briefs, and
decisions. Percolation is a useful tool for a Supreme Court that
controls its own docket and decides an average of seventy-five
cases a year from more than three hundred thousand lawsuits
in federal district courts and over fifty thousand appeals in federal courts of appeals. 274
In August 2019, the Ninth Circuit limited a district judge’s
nationwide injunction to apply only to the states in its circuit.275
In the absence of proof, findings of fact, and conclusions of law
demonstrating that the plaintiffs needed nationwide relief, the
court emphasized percolation: “To permit such broad injunctions
as a general rule, without an articulated connection to a plaintiff’s particular harm, would unnecessarily ‘stymie novel legal
challenges and robust debate’ arising in different judicial districts.” 276
More important than percolation in the tens of thousands of
lawsuits before the federal courts is the courts’ overarching
goal—to provide prompt and complete relief for wronged plaintiffs and to check lawbreaking and excesses. As Professor
273. See Bray, supra note 11; Cass, supra note 11; Morley, supra note 11;
Wasserman, supra note 10; Sessions Memorandum on Nationwide Injunctions,
supra note 12.
274. In 2018, the United States Supreme Court decided seventy-five lawsuits.
Harold J. Spaeth et al., 2019 Supreme Court Database, SUP. CT. DATABASE,
supremecourtdatabase.org/data.php (last visited Nov. 11, 2019) [https://perma.cc
/H4D5-BFXJ]. In the year ending March 31, 2018, 358,563 lawsuits were filed in
United States district courts, 50,970 appeals were filed in the United States courts
of appeal. Judicial Facts and Figures, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov
/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/judicial-facts-and-figures (last visited Nov. 11,
2019) [https://perma.cc/Q82R-MAZL].
275. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 934 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2019).
276. Id. (quoting City & County of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1244
(9th Cir. 2018)).
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Suzette Malveaux noted, “there are occasions when an issue is
sufficiently ripe and particularly pressing such that it should be
ruled on sooner rather than later.” 277 Judge Gregg Costa added,
“for challenges to policies that are plainly unlawful, the rule of
law would favor speedy and uniform judicial action.” 278 If the
issues are clearly drawn, judicial economy militates against multiple lawsuits and delayed relief. These points are particularly
appropriate when a judge finds that a defendant’s impairment
of a plaintiff’s constitutional rights has created irreparable injury that warrants an injunction.
The parties’ complaints and briefs and the judges’ decisions
that I read to prepare this Article are uniformly well argued on
both sides. Many were brought by state attorneys general, others by specialty organizations, often supported by national law
firms. The federal government’s lawyers are good at defending
lawsuits. These well-developed lawsuits answer the need for
thorough prior consideration of the issues found in national government injunction cases and negate the argument for
percolation.
Finally, the federal government itself argues for haste that
prevents percolation. The federal government’s vertical forum
shopping militates against percolation. As just one example, the
Ninth Circuit upheld a lower court’s preliminary injunction
blocking the federal government’s rollback of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. 279 The government sought mandamus in the Ninth Circuit and certiorari
before the Supreme Court at the discovery stage. 280 The Department of Justice sent a letter to the Ninth Circuit imposing a
deadline on a ruling and threatening to leapfrog the court of appeals and seek Supreme Court review. 281
Fostering percolation is not a policy that is persuasive
enough to override a judge’s ability to grant a nationwide na277. Malveaux, supra note 14, at 58.
278. Gregg Costa, An Old Solution to the Nationwide Injunction Problem, HARV.
L. REV. BLOG (Jan. 25, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/an-old-solution-tothe-nationwide-injunction-problem/ [https://perma.cc/SVL3-CPTP].
279. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476
(9th Cir. 2018).
280. 28 U.S.C. § 2101(e) (2018).
281. Adam Liptak, Trump Asks Supreme Court for Fast Appeal for Transgender
Military Ban, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/23/us
/politics/trump-transgender-ban-supreme-court.html
[https://perma.cc/SX2X9828].
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tional government injunction when circumstances otherwise
warrant that relief.
F. Precedent
The critics of national government injunctions additionally
argue that a federal district judge’s decision lacks force as binding precedent. But a district judge’s national government
injunction has force all over the United States. Similarly, a court
of appeals decision lacks force as binding precedent in the other
federal circuits. But once more, a district judge’s national government injunction has force all over the United States. 282
The critics’ precedent argument is based on the idea that the
government wrongdoer ought to be able to ignore the apparent
law announced by a distinct or appellate court with power to decide. Rule of law principles that support obedience militate
against this precedent argument. Moreover, the critics’ argument regarding formal hierarchal rules of binding precedent is
weak in practice. It underestimates the persuasive precedential
effect that federal district courts’ decisions have for other judges,
and it downgrades the persuasive force of thoughtful district
court opinions. Two examples follow from the national government injunction decisions examined in this Article.
First, the judge in Damus v. Nielsen wrote that “[t]his Court
agrees with the sound reasoning of Judge Wolford of the Western District of New York.” 283 The judge also noted that the
contention at issue in the case “was carefully explained in a recent opinion from the Southern District of California . . . .”284
Second, in City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, where national government injunction opponents argued that district court
decisions are not entitled to binding precedent status, the judge
replied that “[t]he most factually apposite cases regarding permanent injunctions against enforcement grant conditions are
other district court opinions regarding recent attempts to impose
immigration enforcement priorities on localities.” 285

282. See Bray, supra note 11; Cass, supra note 11; Morley, supra note 11, at 616;
Wasserman, supra note 10; Sessions Memorandum on Nationwide Injunctions,
supra note 12.
283. 313 F. Supp. 3d 317, 333 (D.D.C. 2018).
284. Id.
285. 309 F. Supp. 3d 289, 339 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
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When the law is developing rapidly in trial courts and there
is very little appellate law on the issue, trial judges will (and
should) consult their colleagues who are parallel in the judicial
hierarchy. 286 Although a federal court of appeals decision is not
formally binding precedent in other federal circuits, other federal circuits will regard it as persuasive precedent, particularly
if binding precedent is lacking.
G. Asymmetry
Asymmetry is a technical variation of critics’ other, partybased arguments against the national government injunction. 287 If a plaintiff sues the United States and loses, another
plaintiff can still sue the United States. But the reverse is not
true: if the United States loses in the plaintiff’s first lawsuit and
the judge grants a nationwide national government injunction,
then that ends the disputed issue for the United States. The federal government obeys the injunction without being able to
relitigate the issue in a second lawsuit.
The critics add that a plaintiff injunction class cures this
asymmetry because preclusion bars members of the plaintiff
class from suing again if the United States wins. 288 But the government is free from offensive nonmutual issue preclusion; if the
federal government sues and loses, a second plaintiff cannot take
advantage of the first judgment to preclude the government from
relitigating the merits. 289 Critics say that a national government injunction is inconsistent because the government has no
opportunity to relitigate after the judge grants it.
The critics’ asymmetry argument dilutes the force of an injunction. Also, preclusion and injunctions are different and parallel bodies of law. Preclusion rules do not outrank injunction
rules. Quite the reverse. Violation of an injunction can lead to
the judge punishing a nonparty for criminal contempt. The rules
of who must obey an injunction should be narrower than the preclusion rules which lead to only litigative constraint by barring
286. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 262.
287. See Bray, supra note 11; Cass, supra note 11; Morley, supra note 11, at 616;
Wasserman, supra note 10; Sessions Memorandum on Nationwide Injunctions,
supra note 12.
288. See Bray, supra note 11; Cass, supra note 11; Morley, supra note 11, at 616;
Wasserman, supra note 10; Sessions Memorandum on Nationwide Injunctions,
supra note 12.
289. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 162 (1984).
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relitigation. Preclusion may bind a litigant who should be beyond the reach of contempt. 290
H. Nonparty Benefit
One of critics’ major arguments against nationwide national
government injunctions is that they benefit nonparties. 291 Even
Professor Amanda Frost—who argues that a nationwide injunction ought to be a remedial option for a federal court—used
nonparty benefit to define nationwide injunctions. A nationwide
injunction, she says, is an interlocutory or permanent injunction
that a federal judge grants when that injunction benefits nonparties but is not a plaintiff injunction class action. 292
Some injunctions do not affect anyone but the parties. For a
hypothetical example, Tom Trespass trespasses on Owen
Owner’s land to fish in Owen’s creek. The judge grants Owen an
injunction that forbids Tom from trespassing. Only Tom and
Owen are affected by this injunction.
Most injunctions, however, have direct and indirect effects.
Many injunctions directly benefit nonparties. For example, a
single plaintiff’s injunction against a defendant for feedlot air
pollution directly affects and benefits everyone formerly within
range of the abated pollution. 293 Whether or not a plaintiff represents a class, ending the harm for one may benefit many: when
a single plaintiff persuades a court to abate a defendant’s foul
feedlot, all of the neighbors breathe fresher air. 294
“Benefit” is too narrow because it overlooks injunctions’ negative effect on nonparties. An injunction against implementation
of the Affordable Care Act would disadvantage millions of people
who would lose medical insurance coverage. 295 An injunction
290. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 63 (AM. LAW. INST. 1982). “Bind”
is ambiguous even when used to refer to those who should obey an injunction
because it creates confusion about who must obey an injunction, precedent, and
preclusion. Rendleman, supra note 65, at 876–77. Taking “bound” out of these
categories—to mean that a nonparty who “benefits” from an injunction is “bound”
by it—takes the word beyond any sensible meaning.
291. See Bray, supra note 11; Cass, supra note 11; Morley, supra note 11, at 616;
Wasserman, supra note 10; Sessions Memorandum on Nationwide Injunctions,
supra note 12.
292. Frost, supra note 9, at 1071.
293. Rendleman, supra note 50, at 158 n.17.
294. RENDLEMAN, supra note 146, at 506; Rendleman, supra note 50, at 158
n.16.
295. Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019).
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striking down expanded eligibility for overtime under the minimum wage statute means that employees formerly entitled to
overtime pay would not earn more in the future for those eligible
hours, although their employers would benefit because they
would pay regular cost for overtime hours.
Effect on nonparties can be seen in multiple types of litigation. For example, busing decrees in school desegregation
lawsuits affected nonparties, in particular nonparty students
who were transported to distant schools. In Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education, the Court admitted to the effect on nonparties: “The remedy for such segregation may be
administratively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre in
some situations and may impose burdens on some; but all awkwardness and inconvenience cannot be avoided . . . .”296
Although court-ordered transportation triggered widespread
and serious nonparty opposition, judges continued to use busing
decrees to desegregate schools. 297
Similarly, if the court finds legislative districts unconstitutional and redraws the districts, the new districts will affect
territory outside the formerly unconstitutional districts as well
as voters in both the old and new districts. Many of these voters
were probably satisfied with the old districts.
Nationwide injunctions create indirect and ripple benefits.
For example, a comprehensive structural injunction that brings
a prison into compliance with the Constitution creates an indirect ripple effect on the nonparty taxpayers’ tax bills. 298 “[A]
court order directing a local government body to levy its own
taxes is plainly a judicial act within the power of a federal
court” 299 that raises nonparties’ tax bills. Similarly, a plaintiff’s
lawsuit that ends with a declaratory judgment that the defendant’s patent is invalid and an injunction forbidding the

296. 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971).
297. KRUSE & ZELIZER, supra note 45, at 58–61; Nikole Hanna-Jones, News
Analysis, It Was Never About Busing: Court-Ordered Desegregation Worked. But
White Racism Made It Hard to Accept., N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/07/12/opinion/sunday/it-was-never-about-busing.html
[https://perma.cc/BR3L-EJCF]; Laura Meckler, Effective But Never Popular, CourtOrdered Busing Is a Relic Few Would Revive, WASH. POST (July 7, 2019, 6:10 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/effective-but-never-popular-courtordered-busing-is-a-relic-few-would-revive/2019/07/07/dce439c8-9d40-11e9-b27fed2942f73d70_story.html [https://perma.cc/J48A-ADAF].
298. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 511 (2011).
299. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 55 (1990).
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defendant from enforcing it should encourage competition that
lowers prices and indirectly benefits nonparty buyers.
Professor Chayes wrote that relief in public law structural
litigation, usually an injunction, is not “confined in its impact to
the immediate parties; instead, it is forward looking, fashioned
ad hoc on flexible and broadly remedial lines, often having important consequences for many persons including absentees.”300
Class action scholars have identified nonparty benefits from injunction classes. 301
In national government injunction litigation about the rescission of DACA, the Ninth Circuit responded to the government’s request to narrow an injunction affecting nonparties by
noting that “[t]here is no general requirement that an injunction
affect only the parties in the suit.” 302 The court went on to state
that “[a]n injunction is not necessarily made over-broad by extending benefit or protection to persons other than prevailing
parties in the lawsuit—even if it is not a class action—if such
breadth is necessary to give prevailing parties the relief to which
they are entitled.” 303
The nationwide injunction’s critics base their view that injunctions benefitting nonparties are illegitimate on what they
argue is the order’s recent origins. 304 Professor Frost’s justification for national injunctions considers history and the idea of
nonparty benefit. She observes that “the existence of the bill of
peace, and the absence of a clear prohibition against injunctions
affecting nonparties, suggests that there is a credible argument
300. Chayes, supra note 239, at 1302.
301. Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right to Opt Out of
Class Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1058–59 (2002); Richard A. Nagareda,
The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 149, 180 (2003); Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal
Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 398 (2003).
302. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 511
(9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bresgal v. Brock, 843 F.2d 1163, 1169 (9th Cir. 1987)).
303. Id. at 511 (quoting Bresgal, 843 F.2d at 1170–71) (emphasis omitted); see
also Price v. City of Stockton, 390 F.3d 1105, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)
(granting injunction that benefitted nonparties where “the breadth of the injunction
was necessary” to provide relief for plaintiffs); Brito v. Zia Co., 478 F.2d 1200, 1207
(10th Cir. 1973) (stating that the judge may draft an injunction that “benefits”
nonparties); AFGE v. Cavasos, 721 F. Supp. 1361, 1371 (D.D.C. 1989), aff’d in part,
vacated in part sub. nom. AFGE v. Sanders, 926 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(granting injunction because agency regulations that violate the constitution vacate
the rules for all persons, instead of merely preventing the agency from applying the
regulations to complainants); Rendleman, supra note 50, at 158.
304. Bray, supra note 11; Sessions Memorandum on Nationwide Injunctions,
supra note 12.
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that national government injunctions are not a sharp break with
pre-1789 practice. . . .” 305 She also says that “the historical practice supports the conclusion that courts have always had the
authority to issue equitable relief that encompasses nonparties.” 306 Frost’s points are correct. The bill of peace was a joinder
device that allowed a decision to affect nonparties. 307 The nineteenth century Supreme Court seems to have agreed that the
Chancery could resolve the whole dispute to prevent a “multiplicity” of actions at law:
Under the principles which in the federal system distinguish
cases in law from those in equity, the circuit court of the
United States, sitting in equity, can make a comprehensive
decree covering the whole ground of controversy, and thus
avoid the multiplicity of suits that would inevitably arise under the statute. 308

A class action rule was not developed until 1938 and was not
effective until amendments in 1966. After the class action rule
was amended in 1966 to make it functional and more workable,
Professor Kaplan wrote for the advisory committee that “[w]hen
numerous persons stood in the same position toward an adversary so that there was potentially a large number of essentially
identical lawsuits, equity might in effect allow a consolidation of
the expected actions and clear up the entire situation through a
bill of peace.” 309 Because of the modern class action rule, the bill
of peace is obsolete.
Professor James Pfander’s article with Jacob Wentzel and
Professor Mila Sohoni’s separate article have applied scrupulous
research to refute the national government injunction’s critics’
arguments that the “traditional” view was that an injunction
“benefitted” only the party plaintiff and that the national government injunction is a recent innovation. 310 These scholars
305. Frost, supra note 9, at 1081 n.77.
306. Id. at 1081.
307. Brief of Amici Curiae Legal Historians in Support of Plaintiff and Appellee
the City of Chicago, supra note 105, at 8; CHAFEE, supra note 108, at 166.
308. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 517 (1898), aff’d as modified, 171 U.S. 361
(1898).
309. Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 376
(1967).
310. Pfander & Wentzel, supra note 105 (manuscript at 10–11); Sohoni, supra
note 105; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Legal Historians in Support of Plaintiff and
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found that broad, nonparty injunctions were used much earlier
in state and federal courts against both state and federal governments. The government defendants in those cases were
primarily concerned about the substantive merits, not the
breadth, of injunctions. If a court held a statute or executive
measure unconstitutional, it was not enforced at all. 311 The executive branch’s defense—trying to circumscribe the court’s national government injunction against the executive’s illegal
measure—is the innovation here, not the broad injunction
against it.
The critics’ argument that a nonparty benefits from a national government injunction is overstated. If a defendant
violates an injunction, a nonparty lacks the legal ability to enforce it; only the plaintiff or the judge can enforce the injunction
with civil or criminal contempt. 312 A nonparty suffering under a
defendant’s illegal post-injunction policy has two alternatives.
First, she can intervene in the original lawsuit. 313 Second, she
can file a new lawsuit, cite the first judge’s decision as precedent,
and demand an injunction of her own. The new plaintiff may adduce the previous decision as precedent but she cannot, under
present law, use the preclusion doctrines to prevent the government from relitigating. 314
Appellee the City of Chicago, supra note 105, at 15–18; Trammell, supra note 156,
at 989; Portia Pedro, Toward Establishing a Pre-extinction Definition of
“Nationwide Injunctions,” 91 U. COLO. L. REV. 847, 873 (2020) (adding “that Bray’s
historical arguments about equity are not as ironclad as they might first seem to
be”).
311. Sohoni, supra note 105, at 977.
312. Northside Realty Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 605 F.2d 1348, 1356 (5th
Cir. 1979); Secor v. Singleton, 35 F. 376, 378 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1888); RENDLEMAN,
supra note 146, at 506; Rendleman, supra note 50.
313. FED. R. CIV. P. 24; Rendleman, supra note 50, at 159 nn.21–23; Amanda
Bronstad, Duke Pays $54.5M to Settle ‘No Poach’ Class Action After DOJ Intervenes,
LAW.COM (May 20, 2019, 7:05 PM), https://www.law.com/2019/05/20/duke-pays-545m-to-settle-no-poach-class-action-after-doj-intervenes/ [https://perma.cc/ZUN7FQCY].
314. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984); Clopton, supra note 11.
Professor Clopton argues persuasively that Mendoza is incorrect. He argues that
the United States is a skilled litigant that does not need to be protected from
offensive nonmutual issue preclusion. Indeed, Justice Gorsuch wrote that the
federal government is the most powerful of parties. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct.
2400, 2425 (2019). Clopton’s solution to the national government injunction is that
a judge may grant an injunction broad enough to protect those nonparties who
would be likely candidates for nonmutual preclusion. The judge, he adds, ought to
decline to issue a national government injunction when nonparties would be
unlikely candidates for nonmutual or nonparty preclusion. But the judge should be
skeptical of any wait-and-see plaintiffs and exercise caution when there are
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The way a nonparty benefits is that the government defendant ceases its improper behavior and obeys the plaintiff’s injunction. Rule of law principles, the rule that requires agents to obey
an injunction against their principal, 315 and the traditional doctrine of in personam jurisdiction support the government’s obedience to the apparent law. By calling it a “nationwide
injunction,” critics mean that the injunction affects everyone in
the United States because that is where the U.S. government
and its agents are. The critics have not developed the related
“who-must-obey” issue. Critics argue that nonparty benefits go
too far. 316 They chastise nonparty benefits based on the unspoken idea that the government will comply.
The supposed beneficiaries of the national government injunction—not the defendant or the injunction’s geographic
coverage—create the conditions that critics oppose. Focusing on
nonparties directs attention to the public and away from the defendant (whom the court has ordered to obey). Emphasis on
nonparty benefits downgrades or ignores judicial review, separation of powers, and the basic equitable principles of in
personam jurisdiction and agents’ obedience to injunctions. The
critics also ignore the informal understanding that the government complies with injunctions and ignore the court’s role,
which is to extend complete relief to victims and to suppress lawbreaking. This distraction may erode relief for those harmed by
the defendants’ illegal conduct.
My view is that when a federal judge drafts relief after the
federal executive has broken the law, the identity of the federal
executive defendant and the compliance of its agents are more
important than how the injunction affects nonparties. Focusing
on nonparties distracts from the more important issue of how a
court orders the federal executive to obey the law to assure that
people retain their constitutional and statutory rights as well as
to end the government’s illegal conduct. The critics’ nonparty argument ought to remind litigants and other observers to

inconsistent prior judgments. Overruling Mendoza to allow nonparty preclusion
against the United States will, Clopton argues, reduce the need for national
government injunctions because second lawsuits against the United States will
then be streamlined. Id.
315. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(2).
316. See Bray, supra note 11; Cass, supra note 11; Morley, supra note 11, at 616;
Wasserman, supra note 10; Sessions Memorandum on Nationwide Injunctions,
supra note 12.
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consider an injunction’s positive and negative effects on
nonparties.
Critics concede that a national government injunction is not
inappropriate when the plaintiffs sue on behalf of an injunction
class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). 317 The reasoning is that the judge’s certification of the plaintiff injunction
class will slow the litigation down, check loose procedure, and
protect nonparties.
Accepting a nationwide injunction class is a necessary concession. In litigation about the recapture of benefits overpayments in 1979, the Supreme Court in Califano v. Yamasaki approved a nationwide plaintiff injunction class, noting that “class
relief is appropriate in civil actions brought in federal court, including those seeking to overturn determinations of the
departments of the Executive Branch of the Government in
cases where judicial review of such determinations is authorized.” 318
The Court’s reasoning was based on the plaintiffs’ need for
complete relief:
Nor is a nationwide class inconsistent with principles of equity jurisprudence, since the scope of injunctive relief is dictated by the extent of the violation established, not by the
geographical extent of the plaintiff class. If a class action is
otherwise proper, and if jurisdiction lies over the claims of
the members of the class, the fact that the class is nationwide
in scope does not necessarily mean that the relief afforded the
plaintiffs will be more burdensome than necessary to redress
the complaining parties. 319

The Court rejected the government’s argument that an injunction in favor of a nationwide plaintiff class prevented the
development of issues through percolation in several lower
courts: “[A] federal court when asked to certify a nationwide
class should take care to ensure that nationwide relief is indeed
appropriate in the case before it, and that certification of such a
class would not improperly interfere with the litigation of similar issues in other judicial districts.” 320
317.
318.
319.
320.

See Bray, supra note 11; Morley, supra note 11, at 616.
442 U.S. 682, 700 (1979).
Id. at 702 (citation omitted).
Id.
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The availability of a national government injunction when
the plaintiff sues on behalf of an injunction class shows that the
critics’ argument against the national government injunction is
based on equity jurisdiction, not on subject matter jurisdiction.
A judge, who has authority and power to grant a national government injunction in closely related class action litigation, has
authority and power to grant a nationwide national government
injunction in nonclass litigation.
A plaintiff injunction class differs from the better-known
plaintiff damages class. An injunction class member receives no
notice of the ongoing litigation and has no right to exit the class
by opting out. A damages class member receives notice and an
opportunity to opt out. Authorities maintain that in both types
of class action, a winning defendant earns preclusion. In other
words, the authorities assume that if the defendant wins on the
merits, an absentee injunction class member will be precluded
from suing the defendant on the same cause of action. Injunction
class members remain unbeknownst in the class. They have neither ability to control it nor any day in court. 321
Binding a class member who received neither notice nor an
opportunity to exit seems unfair. But courts have not developed
the preclusion rule because the injunction class litigation has
taken another route. It has evolved through class certification,
negotiated consent decrees, and motions to modify or dissolve.
The injunction class’s development has not followed the scenario
of litigation to a substantive decision—defendant victories on
the substantive law—followed by second suits by injunction
class members. 322 The injunction class, which ignores differences within plaintiff injunction classes, “veers toward
unconstitutional territory.” 323
Professor Fiss observed that the plaintiff injunction class is
not the foundation of the structural injunction because of the
“group character of the underlying substantive claim.” 324 An ab321. Marcus, supra note 188, at 658. Professor Marcus speculates that there is
“no trans-substantive explanation for why injunctive relief class members lack
notice and opt-out rights, [the drafting committee] undoubtedly believed that the
substantive consequences of class treatment justified res judicata, and they
understood that interest representation provided the constitutional footing for this
preclusive effect.” Id. at 716.
322. RENDLEMAN, supra note 146, at 527; John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The
Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 1446–50 (2003).
323. Marcus, supra note 188, at 703, 711.
324. FISS, supra note 170, at 15.
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sent injunction class member who received no notice may be as
disassociated from the litigation as a nonparty. Nevertheless,
the class-based remedy may affect nonparties: “Whether plaintiff proceeds as an individual or on a class-suit basis, the requested relief generally will benefit not only the claimant but all
other persons subject to the practice or the rule under attack.”325
An injunction class action does not differ much from other civil
rights litigation. Nonparty status and absent class membership
work out to be about the same. 326
Historically, defendants who have opposed Rule 23(b)(2)
certification have not succeeded. 327 The unqualified point in an
earlier edition of the popular Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice
and Procedure treatise was that Rule 23(a)’s prerequisites are
liberally applied in certifying (b)(2) discrimination classes that
involve civil and constitutional rights. 328 The 2018 edition qualified the liberal application in employment discrimination cases
where the plaintiffs asked for an injunction class and also sought
to recover money for lost income. 329
It remains to be seen how the narrowed certification of injunction classes in employment discrimination cases affects
national government injunction classes not also seeking money
damages. Professor Malveaux is not optimistic: “Aggregate litigation is being undermined at the very same time Bray is suggesting greater dependence on it [for nationwide national government injunctions]. But the government cannot have it both
ways. As the availability of the class action device goes down,
the need for the national injunction goes up.” 330 My own view is
less pessimistic than Malveaux’s: the structural injunction,
which is entrenched and routine, will not change much.
Moreover, the critics’ argument that the injunction class
certification process will prevent improvident remedies and pro-

325. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 245, §§ 1771, 2903.
326. Marcus, supra note 188, at 703, 716.
327. DG ex rel. Stricklin v. Devaughn, 594 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2010); Shook v.
El Paso County, 386 F.3d 963 (10th Cir. 2004); Marcus, supra note 188, at 706.
328. 7 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1771, at 663 (1972) (commenting on the “liberalized application of
the Rule 23(a) prerequisites” in Rule 23(b)(2) cases).
329. Id. (narrowed by Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982) and
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes 564 U.S. 338 (2011)); see also id. § 2903.
330. Malveaux, supra note 14, at 60.
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tect nonparties seems to me and to Professor Frost to be
overstated. 331
There are some differences between an injunction class remedy and an injunction without a plaintiff class. The most important difference is that a class member can raise contempt
charges, but a nonparty cannot. 332 Additionally, a class of plaintiffs makes the case more difficult to moot. 333 Neither of these
differences have played much of a practical role in actual
litigation.
An injunction class is a good idea and is not exceptionally
burdensome. Should a nationwide injunction class be a prerequisite for a nationwide national government injunction? In
short, no. The executive may change government policy quickly
and improperly in a way that affects dispersed, and possibly
transitory, people. A lawsuit for a national government injunction is complex and specialized litigation that requires prompt
preparation by specialized plaintiffs’ lawyers with depth and resources. The victims of the improper policy may lack the ability
to sue individually. State attorneys general and activist membership organizations should be able to sue the wrongdoers for
quick relief to protect nonparties from irreparable injury. Seeking a plaintiff injunction class is a salutary but not an indispensable tactic. The judge might, however, certify a provisional injunction class before granting plaintiffs interlocutory relief. 334
I. Single Judge
The critics’ final argument is that the national government
injunction violates separation of powers principles because a single judge can stop a national executive program. 335 A nationwide
national government injunction, they argue, gives too much
power to the judiciary at the expense of the executive.

331. Frost, supra note 9, at 1071 (writing that national government injunctions
do not require class action certification protections for nonparties).
332. Marcus, supra note 188, at 701 n.253; Rendleman, supra note 50, at 159
nn.21–23.
333. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 383 (1992); Rendleman,
supra note 50, at 159 n.24.
334. See, e.g., Damus v. Nielsen, 313 F. Supp. 3d 317, 335 (D.D.C. 2018).
335. See Bray, supra note 11, at 420; Cass, supra note 11, at 1; Morley, supra
note 11, at 620; Wasserman, supra note 10, at 339; Sessions Memorandum on
Nationwide Injunctions, supra note 12.
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The critics’ argument is contrary to core ideas of constitutional law and separation of powers. The judiciary has the final
word on what the Constitution means, and it uses judicial review
to exercise that final say. Justice Brandeis wrote:
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the
convention of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to preclude
the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid
friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to
the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy. 336

The federal courts keep the federal executive in constitutional line. 337 In a system without the nationwide national government injunction, the federal executive could develop and implement policies and programs that avoid obeying the law.
In Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Justice Scalia
wrote:
It is true enough that we have long held that federal courts
may in some circumstances grant injunctive relief against
state officers who are violating, or planning to violate, federal
law. But that has been true not only with respect to violations
of federal law by state officials, but also with respect to violations of federal law by federal officials. . . . What our cases
demonstrate is that, “in a proper case, relief may be given in
a court of equity . . . to prevent an injurious act by a public
officer.”
The ability to sue to enjoin unconstitutional actions by
state and federal officers is the creation of courts of equity
and reflects the long history of judicial review of illegal executive action, tracing back to England. 338

In short, under equitable jurisdiction and established precedent, a plaintiff may sue federal officials in federal court to en-

336. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
337. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952).
338. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 327 (2015) (quoting
Carroll v. Safford, 44 U.S. 441, 463 (1845)) (citations omitted) (rejecting an
injunction in the absence of a private right of action).
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join their unconstitutional actions. 339 The federal court may determine whether the President “has acted within the law.” 340
The critics take a narrow and anachronistic view of the role
of courts and litigation. It is narrow because the judiciary has
always had the backup role, first articulated by Chief Justice
John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, “to say what the law
is.” 341 It is anachronistic because it neglects the rise of divided
government, a too-activist executive, group litigation, and the
injunction as a remedial tool to enforce statutory and constitutional rights.
The United States lacks a constitutional court to suppress
outlier government decisions, as is found in other nations’ constitutions. 342 This work falls on the trial judges in the U.S.
district courts as “regular” litigation with the usual appellate
processes in the courts of appeals and Supreme Court. 343 The
use of three-judge district courts to determine whether statutes
are unconstitutional has faded into the sunset. 344 One way for
Congress to overcome the single-judge and forum-shopping issues is to pass a new three-judge district court statute.
Professor Jeffery Rosen closes his short biography of President Taft by reminding us that “[a]s independent judges represent the last check on unconstitutional encroachments by the
president, Congress and the states, conservatives, classical liberals, and progressives alike are converging around a renewed
appreciation for judicial independence.” 345
Like grading exams for a professor, correcting Congress and
the President may not be the best part of a federal judge’s workload. Yet, it is vital. The better approach, as a federal judge, is
to grit your teeth and do your job. 346
339. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,
491 n.2 (2010); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001).
340. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 703 (1997); see also Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 731, 753–54 (1982).
341. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
342. CONSTITUIÇÃO
FEDERAL
art.
102–03
(Braz.);
GRUNDGESETZ
[CONSTITUTION] art. 92–94 (Ger.).
343. WOOD, supra note 19, at 448.
344. Pfander & Wentzel, supra note 105 (manuscript at 1).
345. JEFFREY ROSEN, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 137 (2018); see also Burbank,
supra note 74, at 22.
346. UROFSKY, supra note 39, at 30 (“In any case involving the president or
Congress, the Court nearly always repeats the mantra that deference is due to the
judgments of the coordinate branches of government. Despite that, the Court has
no problem telling the president that he cannot do certain things.”).
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V. FILTERS AND PRINCIPLES OF CONFINEMENT
This Article now turns to whether plaintiffs are qualified for
an injunction after prevailing on the merits and, if they are qualified, how to draft the injunction’s breadth, size, and shape. The
judge’s equitable discretion to shape the injunction exceeds his
discretion to choose the remedy.
National government injunctions enforce the Constitution
and federal statutes. They provide complete relief for plaintiffs
and protect thousands of victims who may be unable to protect
themselves. They avoid piecemeal, duplicative litigation, promote national uniformity, and obviate the administrative difficulties that arise when improper government activity is allowed.
Complete relief places the plaintiff where the defendant’s
obedience would have, as nearly as a court order can. Through
an injunction, the judge stops the defendant from impinging on
the plaintiff’s ability to exercise a constitutional or statutory
right. The defendant’s side of the coin is that “injunctive relief
should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary
to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.” 347
Sometimes a group remedy based on interest representation
is the only practical solution. An example comes from implementing Brown v. Board of Education. 348 Earlier decisions
granted plaintiffs individual freedom-of-choice injunctions by
admitting only the named plaintiffs to formerly segregated
schools. Desegregation was making only incremental progress
until plaintiffs started seeking injunction class relief: “Individual black students choosing one-by-one to attend white schools,
however, would never disassemble the segregation edifice.”349
“A student-by-student approach to desegregation litigation
posed enormous difficulties and all but nullified Brown. To those
invested in the success of litigation-driven desegregation, class
treatment of claims seemed essential.” 350
A federal court does not casually void executive branch activity or an act of Congress. Federal judges are deferential to
their parallel elected branches. A judge ought to be wary of overturning the decision of an elected branch of government on an

347.
348.
349.
350.

Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Marcus, supra note 188, at 688.
Id. at 680–81; see also Rendleman, supra note 179, at 1587–93.
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important issue. 351 Commentators have noted that “the justices
traditionally are solicitous when a president raises questions
concerning the separation of powers.” 352 Professor Frost adds:
A single district court judge should not lightly assert control
over federal policy for the nation, or take action that would
prevent her fellow judges from reaching their own decisions
in cases involving different plaintiffs. But when the benefits
outweigh the costs, the courts should have this tool at
hand. 353

To accept that a judge may grant a nationwide national government injunction that forbids the federal executive’s
overreach does not mean that a court will grant a nationwide
injunction for all federal executive breaches. One question is
whether another order will implement a proper remedy and complete justice, including the suppression of official wrongdoing. A
second question is how a nationwide injunction will affect third
persons not connected with the lawsuit. Context and implementation details matter. These considerations are part of the
judge’s equitable discretion in choosing and tailoring a remedy.
Other possible or actual constraints on the national government injunction are: class certification; the permanent and
preliminary injunction standards, including balancing the hardships, the likelihood of success on the merits, the public interest,
the effect on third persons, and plaintiffs’ evidence of loss; the
judge’s role in drafting the order; motions to modify or dissolve;
and prompt appellate review. Other procedural techniques that
broaden participation on the plaintiff side are intervention as a
party to express supporting claims 354 and nonparty’ participation as amici to provide support and differing perspectives.
Once a plaintiff’s complaint surmounts the hurdle of the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the next procedural stage is discov351. See, e.g., Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 381–82 (2004)
(recognizing deference to the executive in deciding whether to entertain
mandamus).
352. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Will Take up Trump’s Broad Claims of
Protection from Investigation, WASH. POST (Dec. 13, 2019, 5:28 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-will-take-uptrumps-broad-claims-of-protection-from-investigation/2019/12/13/1de84cd6-1d1911ea-8d58-5ac3600967a1_story.html [https://perma.cc/HZ5W-CGGS].
353. Frost, supra note 9, at 1116.
354. FED. R. CIV. P. 24; Bronstad, supra note 313.
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ery. The government’s procedural efforts to avoid submitting to
discovery are another procedural chapter. 355
A. An Injunction Class Action
A national government injunction plaintiff is advised to seek
an injunction class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(2). The checklist for the judge’s certification of an injunction class has four requirements in Rule 23(a) and one in Rule
23(b)(2). The Rule 23(a) requirements are:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 356

If possible, plaintiffs seeking nationwide injunctions should
define and state a nationwide Rule 23(a) plaintiff class with:
enough class members, a named plaintiff who has a claim typical
of class members’ claims, common questions of law and fact, the
same injury, capable lawyers, and no internal class conflict. Rule
23(b)(2) requires the defendant’s misconduct to apply generally
to the plaintiff class and be curable with an injunction or declaratory judgment and acknowledges that separate actions risk
inconsistency. 357 From my reading of complaints and decisions
for this Article, the plaintiffs’ adequacy of representation has
been assured.
B. Prerequisites for a Permanent Injunction
The prerequisites for a permanent injunction and a preliminary injunction are additional hurdles for a national
355. Vladeck, supra note 91.
356. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
357. See, e.g., Damus v. Nielsen, 313 F. Supp. 3d 317, 334–35 (D.D.C. 2018)
(provisional class certified).
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government injunction plaintiff. In eBay v. MercExchange, the
Supreme Court said that a plaintiff seeking a final or permanent
injunction must demonstrate:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a
remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. 358

Plaintiffs’ adequate remedy at law—damages—has not yet
come up in national government injunction litigation. The court
assumes plaintiffs’ irreparable injury from the defendant’s constitutional violation. 359 Balancing the hardships compares the
plaintiffs’ benefit from an injunction with defendant’s burden
from it. Either balancing the hardships or considering the public
interest can lead the court to examine an injunction’s third-party
effects. 360 A hypothetical example of third-party effects that
would militate against a national government injunction would
occur in an Affordable Care Act lawsuit where an injunction
holding the program unconstitutional could lead to twenty million people losing health insurance. 361 Possible substitutes for

358. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
359. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976); Doug Rendleman, Irreparability
Resurrected?: Does a Recalibrated Irreparable Injury Rule Threaten the Warren
Court’s Establishment Clause Legacy?, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1343, 1380–88
(2002).
360. For example, the New York State Court of Appeals’ well-known decision in
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1970), was a private
nuisance lawsuit brought because of the defendant’s particulate pollution. In
approving permanent damages instead of an injunction, the court mentioned both
the defendant’s investment in its plant and the number of its employees. Balancing
the hardships would involve comparing the defendant’s hardships from an
injunction to the plaintiff’s hardships without an injunction, a comparison that
apparently considered the defendant’s investment and ultimately favored the
cement plant. The company’s employees were nonparties who would be adversely
affected if the plant were shuttered, another factor that apparently militated
against an injunction. The majority did not, however, mention another nonparty
effect: the particulate pollution’s effect on public health. Id.
361. In the actual lawsuit, the trial judge granted a declaratory judgment
stating that the program was unconstitutional. The court of appeals affirmed that
the program violated the constitution but remanded for the trial judge to reconsider
severability. Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019). As of late 2019,
the court is probably a year from determining a remedy.
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an injunction include a declaratory judgment, a delayed injunction, and a stay.
C. Prerequisites for an Interlocutory Injunction
The federal rules permit two forms of interlocutory injunction: the temporary restraining order and the preliminary
injunction. 362 The judge may grant the plaintiff a temporary restraining order (TRO) without notice to the defendant. The
federal government is everywhere in the United States: it is
available for formal notice, meaning at least notice by email, fax,
or telephone. 363 The reading for this Article did not reveal any
ex parte orders against the United States. I cannot think of an
emergency that clamors for such immediate attention that the
judge should grant the plaintiff an ex parte TRO against the
ubiquitous United States without any notice at all.
Before granting a final injunction, a judge must determine
that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits. And that judge decides the interlocutory preliminary injunction before the parties
have developed a full record:
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the
merits can be held. Given this limited purpose and given the
haste that is often necessary if those positions are to be preserved, a preliminary injunction is customarily granted on
the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that
is less complete than in a trial on the merits. 364

The standard for a preliminary injunction includes the
plaintiff’s likelihood of success. A preliminary injunction plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) likelihood of success on the merits, (2)
likelihood of suffering irreparable harm without preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities tips in plaintiff’s favor, and (4) a
preliminary injunction will be in the public interest. 365
Determining the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits sometimes revolves around whether to apply a sliding scale.
The classic statement of the sliding scale test is:
362.
363.
364.
365.

FED. R. CIV. P. 65.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(i).
Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981).
Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
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[T]hat a preliminary injunction should issue only upon a
clear showing of either (1) probable success on the merits and
possible irreparable injury, or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for
litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief. 366

Under the test’s second prong, the judge may grant the
plaintiff a preliminary injunction when the plaintiff shows “a
fair ground for litigation.” I respectfully submit that, before enjoining the federal executive, a judge should find that the
plaintiff has more than a 50 percent chance of prevailing. The
judge should put the “fair ground of litigation” question to one
side for a national government preliminary injunction.
The federal rule tells the judge to grant a plaintiff an interlocutory order, a TRO, or a preliminary injunction only after the
plaintiff posts an injunction bond to indemnify the defendant if
the interlocutory order turns out, on plenary hearing, to have
been incorrect. 367 Injunction bonds are discretionary in national
government injunction lawsuits. The decisions usually do not
mention them, although one court discussed and then waived
the bond. 368 Waiving the bond is the better approach.
Another possible technique is for the judge to combine the
preliminary injunction and final injunction hearings, in effect
leapfrogging the preliminary injunction. 369 The judge will then
decide whether to grant the plaintiff a final injunction.
The judge who is deciding an interlocutory injunction will
make a written ruling on fact and law, stating reasons and
terms. 370 Stating the reasoning prompts the trial judge to think
through the issues and helps the appellate court understand the
lower court’s decision.

366. Sonesta Int’l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assoc., 483 F.2d 247, 250 (2d Cir.
1973) (emphasis omitted).
367. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c).
368. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 349 F. Supp. 3d 838 (N.D. Cal. 2018);
see also Pedro, supra note 310, at 873 (“Bray’s historical arguments about equity
are not as ironclad as they might first seem to be.”).
369. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a)(2); Morton Denlow, The Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction: Time for a Uniform Federal Standard, 22 REV. LITIG. 495 (2003).
370. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1)(2), 65(d)(1).
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D. Proof and Findings
The adversarial hearing for a preliminary or final national
government injunction will be based on briefing and will include
declarations or affidavits, oral evidence if needed, and argument. The judge will base the injunction on the evidence. The
plaintiff should adduce nationwide evidence to support a nationwide order. Frost wrote, “The best practice is for a federal district court to establish procedures to ensure that it has all the
relevant information about the costs and benefits of the proposed
scope of an injunction before issuing it.” 371
The plaintiff’s proof is crucial. In August 2019, the Ninth
Circuit decided against the government’s motion to stay a nationwide preliminary injunction. 372 It said that the government
had not shown that it was likely to prevail on the merits. The
Ninth Circuit refused to stay the entire preliminary injunction,
instead staying the injunction only as it applied to states outside
the circuit, explaining that “the nationwide scope of the injunction is not supported by the record as it stands.” 373
Also, the trial judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law
must lay the foundation for nationwide relief. In the decision on
the stay described in the prior paragraph, the Ninth Circuit
added that the trial judge had “failed to discuss whether a nationwide injunction is necessary to remedy Plaintiffs’ alleged
harm.” 374 In addition to staying the trial judge’s nationwide injunction outside of the Ninth Circuit, the court sent the
nationwide feature back to the trial judge for proof and findings
of plaintiffs’ nationwide harm. 375
“Sanctuary city” litigation is another example of the need
for nationwide proof. Local police sometimes decline to implement federal executive orders that facilitate enforcement of
federal immigration policies. These localities are called “sanctuary cities.” But the “sanctuary city” is a diverse, nonuniform

371. Frost, supra note 9, at 1116.
372. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 934 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2019).
373. Id. at 1028; see also Calvin Klein Indus., Inc. v. BFK H.K., Ltd., 714 F.
Supp. 78, 78–80 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“Accordingly, defendants are preliminarily
enjoined from selling the infringing goods in the United States, and in such other
markets as Calvin Klein may demonstrate that it has established its presence,
through either direct sales or licensees.”).
374. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 934 F.3d at 1029.
375. Id. at 1031.
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concept with many types. 376 Judges in sanctuary city lawsuits
seem to be correctly deciding not to grant or approve nationwide
national government injunctions because local resistance to the
federal policy differs from locality to locality. 377
Equitable discretion allows the trial judge to evaluate factual nuance and consider the litigation’s context: “The decision
to grant or deny permanent injunctive relief is an act of equitable discretion by the district court, reviewable on appeal for
abuse of discretion.” 378
E. Drafting the Injunction
This Article contends that the major issues in national government injunctions are proof and drafting. The judge must provide the winning plaintiff or plaintiffs with complete relief without forbidding the defendant from engaging in protected activity.
There are two ways to reduce the number of the government’s agents who must obey an injunction: amending the
related rule of civil procedure and drafting the injunction.
Amending the rule is not a good idea. In particular, an amendment to limit federal courts’ orders to “accord with the historical
practice in federal courts in acting only for the protection of parties to the litigation” 379 is inadvisable and wrongheaded. It
would limit the courts’ remedial power based on the dubious
analysis of legal history shown earlier in this Article. 380 If nothing else, the history is ambiguous.
The Supreme Court’s remedies decision in Brown v. Board
of Education381 contributed two ideas that may carry over to
drafting national government injunctions. First is the idea of
376. Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”, 58 B.C. L.
REV. 1703 (2018).
377. See City & County of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1244–45 (9th
Cir. 2018) (vacating a national government injunction and remanding); Frost, supra
note 9, at 1102.
378. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
379. Letter from Samuel L. Bray, Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law, to
Advisory Comm. on Rules of Civil Procedure (March 1, 2017), http://
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/17-cv-e-suggestion_bray_0.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/8MRS-SCM4] (proposing an amendment to Rule 65(d) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: “Every order granting an injunction and every restraining
order must accord with the historical practice in federal courts in acting only for
the protection of parties to the litigation . . . .”).
380. See Pfander & Wentzel, supra note 105; Sohoni, supra note 105.
381. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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possible delay as a result of implementing change in a bureaucracy. The Court referred to that as “all deliberate speed.”382
Second, the Court adjured respect for defendant government officials. 383
Two examples of types of injunctions that are geographically
circumscribed show that courts can subject the national government injunction to limiting principles to prevent injunctions that
are too broad. These examples are antisuit injunctions and antitrust divestment injunctions.
An antisuit injunction forbids a litigant from pursuing litigation in another forum. It operates on the defendant—not the
foreign court—but it does affect the foreign court’s power to act.
This leads to caution, restrictive rules, and possible dueling injunctions. Courts write narrow rules to grant an interstate antisuit injunction. For example, in Tabor & Co. v. McNall the
court noted that “[t]he trial judge did not cite, nor does the record
disclose, any facts to show why an injunction is necessary to
avert ‘fraud, gross wrong or oppression’. Consequently, it was
error to enjoin the McNalls from proceeding in a foreign
court.” 384 In Wells v. Wells, the court said that the judge’s power
to enjoin a suit in another state “is a matter of great delicacy
invoked with great restraint in order to avoid distressing conflicts and reciprocal interference with jurisdiction.” 385 A court
will be likely to deny full faith and credit to an out-of-state antisuit injunction. 386
Courts may be even more stingy with international antisuit
injunctions. For example, the Eighth Circuit noted that several
other circuits have adopted a “conservative approach”
under which a foreign antisuit injunction will issue only
if the movant demonstrates (1) an action in a foreign
jurisdiction would prevent United States jurisdiction or
threaten a vital United States policy, and (2) the domestic interests outweigh concerns of international comity.
Under the conservative approach, “[c]omity dictates

382. Id. at 301.
383. Id. at 299.
384. 333 N.E.2d 562, 564 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
385. 343 N.E.2d 215, 217 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976).
386. Baker by Thomas v. Gen. Motors, Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 241 (1998) (no full
faith and credit for antisuit injunction).
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that foreign antisuit injunctions be issued sparingly
and only in the rarest of cases . . . .” 387
Similarly, judges presiding in antitrust cases must consider
the breadth of relief and ask whether an injunction is proper
when it requires the losing defendant to divest. If the plaintiff is
private, the Department of Justice will weigh in, and the judge
will consider several factors for an injunction. The judge may
appoint a special master to monitor and implement a divestment
injunction. 388
Additionally, a court may limit an injunction to a defined
territory. One example is an injunction enforcing a former employee’s activity under a noncompetition covenant that specifies
a “reasonable” territory. 389 Another example is a trademark injunction that protects the plaintiff within a particular area. 390
The Ninth Circuit once narrowed a district judge’s nationwide national government injunction, vacating the injunction in
nonplaintiff states and cautioning against broad injunctions.391
The Fifth Circuit similarly limited an injunction preventing enforcement of a federal program to only one state. 392
Courts can develop limiting principles to apply when granting national government injunctions, and they can draft
injunctions that are no broader than needed.
F. Appellate Review
The final constraint on national government injunctions is
appellate review—a decision from a more detached, collegial appellate court. National government injunction plaintiffs will
387. Goss Int’l Corp. v. Man Roland Druckmaschinen Aktiengesellschaft, 491
F.3d 355, 359 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Gua Shan Co. v. Bankers Tr. Co., 956 F.2d
1349, 1354 (6th Cir. 1992)) (internal citations omitted).
388. See Steves & Sons, Inc. v. JELD-WEN, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 3d 614, 648–51
(E.D. Va. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 19-1397 (4th Cir. Apr. 16, 2019).
389. E.g., Turnell v. CentiMark Corp., 796 F.3d 656, 664–67 (7th Cir. 2015).
390. E.g., Blue Ribbon Feed Co. v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc., 731 F.2d
415, 422 (7th Cir. 1984).
391. California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 575–81 (9th Cir. 2018) (vacating the
portion of the injunction barring enforcement of rules in nonplaintiff states). But
see E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 934 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2019)
(declining to extend Azar and granting the motion for stay pending appeal insofar
as the injunction applies outside the Ninth Circuit).
392. Texas v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 933 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2019)
(enjoining the United States from enforcing the Guidance in Texas).
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seek a trial judge that they think will be predisposed to be sympathetic; as critics put it, they will forum shop. From at least
Chafee on, observers have insisted that a defendant’s proper
course of action for an objectionable injunction is appellate review, not defiance. 393
Appellate courts review injunctions to determine whether
there was an abuse of discretion. 394 Courts of appeals should review all national government injunctions with a narrower concept of abuse. The trial judge’s discretion when issuing national
government injunctions should be tempered by stricter standards than for other injunctions.
A losing party has a right to appeal both a preliminary injunction and a final injunction. 395 A full federal appeal with
briefs, oral argument, and a written decision can take about one
year, which is too long for the government to wait for an appellate decision about a nationwide injunction.
The government’s lawyers have unleashed a barrage of vertical forum shopping in district courts to secure appellate review
from a potentially more friendly and perhaps partisan Supreme
Court majority. Professor Vladeck shows how the government
has skillfully used appellate procedure to accelerate appellate
review of trial judges’ nationwide national government injunction decisions that are usually not subject to review. 396
The government risks losing credibility through excessive
use of emergency appellate techniques. 397 It is like the mythical
shepherd boy who repeatedly but falsely called “wolf,” later to be
disbelieved when a wolf actually threatened his flock. Vladeck
concludes that the mythical lad is not present because the Su-

393. CHAFEE, supra note 108, at 353.
394. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
395. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292(a)(1) (2018).
396. Stephen I. Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133
HARV. L. REV. 123 (2019); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); FED. R. APP. P. 8
(interlocutory appeals); id. Rule 5 (accelerated appeals and mandamus); id. Rule 21
(certiorari before judgment).
397. C. Ryan Barber, ‘A Very Difficult Time’: Challenges for Career Lawyers at
Trump’s DOJ, LAW.COM (July 15, 2019, 6:58 PM), https://www.law.com
/nationallawjournal/2019/07/15/a-very-difficult-time-challenges-for-careerlawyers-at-trumps-doj/ [https://perma.cc/4NB7-ZBYC]; Matthew Collette, Draining
the Reservoir: The Steady Erosion of Credibility at the DOJ, LAW.COM (July 16,
2019, 5:47 PM), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2019/07/16/draining-thereservoir-the-steady-erosion-of-credibility-at-the-doj/
[https://perma.cc/L6C9WR3X].
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preme Court has been open to the government’s persistent
pressure. 398
Appellate review of nationwide national government injunctions protects the federal government defendant and advances
the public interest in prompt and, we hope, accurate decisions.
CONCLUSION
The national government injunction critics have developed
an inaccurate narrative that has been difficult to dislodge. The
key to the analysis of nationwide relief is not the people an injunction affects. Instead, it is the defendants and their agents
that injunctions require to obey. When an executive branch defendant’s agents comply with an injunction, as they should, the
injunction may affect nonparties.
One way of understanding the critics national government
injunction’s narrative is as persons advancing an extreme form
of injunction reform aimed at expanding legislative and executive power at the expense of the judiciary. Neither the extreme
left nor the extreme right seem to be at work, however, because
opposition to nationwide national government injunctions has
been bipartisan.
The critics disapprove and seek to circumscribe the federal
courts’ remedial power to grant broad injunctions against improper executive branch measures. They would dilute the
federal courts’ traditional judicial review of executive branch
misconduct through the regular litigation process. The critics’
arguments would limit a federal judge’s remedial ability to issue
a nationwide national government injunction that grants complete relief to wronged plaintiffs and curbs executive branch
defendants’ misconduct. They overlook the established rule that
a defendant’s agents must obey an injunction as well as the in
personam doctrine that an injunction is effective against the defendant beyond the issuing court’s jurisdiction.
Although these principles apply to other losing defendants,
the critics favor liberating government defendants. They would
398. Vladeck, supra note 396. Dissenting from the Court’s decision to stay a
national government injunction in Wolf v. Cook County, 140 S. Ct. 681 (2020),
Justice Sotomayor chided the majority for excessive deference to the executive: “It
is hard to say what is more troubling: that the Government would seek this
extraordinary relief seemingly as a matter of course, or that the Court would grant
it.” Id. at 681.
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alter the federal government’s practice of obeying injunctions.
The critics fail to evaluate the principles and filters in equity
procedure that reduce error and militate against abuse. These
include the prerequisites for an injunction, the hearing and trial
process, and the judge’s equitable discretion in drafting an injunction.
The critics’ arguments are unconvincing. The result of accepting the critics’ critiques would be to change constitutional
law in two related areas: separation of powers and injunctions.
It would increase the executive and legislative branches’ power
at the expense of the judiciary. And it would decrease the judiciary’s power to grant injunctions to halt federal government
lawbreaking and misconduct. The critics’ emphasis on issues
like percolation and nonparty benefit should not distract attention from the result of accepting their arguments.
Other scholars favor nationwide national government injunctions with qualifications. Judges, however, should focus on
providing plaintiffs complete relief without overreaching defendants. They should ignore scholars’ calls for a presumption
against nationwide orders 399 or comparisons of injunctions with
preclusion and res judicata principles. 400
I will close on a personal note. I have spent a scholarly career correcting courts’ blunders, mistakes, and miscues and respectfully suggesting proper paths. This Article, written toward
my career’s end, however, concludes that the federal district
judges are getting it right. 401 Professors and Trump Administration officials are trying to divert judges’ attention from the role
judicial review provides them in enforcing the separation of powers. That role is to curb unconstitutional and incorrect federal
executive branch activity and to accord relief to harmed parties.
Rule of law principles mean that the federal government must
follow its own Constitution and statutes. The courts have not
been diverted by critics’ arguments based on lack of authority
and nonparty “benefit.” The major issues in national government injunction litigation fall under the headings of equitable
jurisdiction and equitable discretion. Other important issues are
399. Frost, supra note 9, at 1102; Trammell, supra note 9.
400. Clopton, supra note 11; Trammell, supra note 9.
401. See Suzanna Sherry, Response, A Response to Comments on “Judicial
Activism”: Liberty’s Safety Net, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 467, 476 (2013) (“I believe that
federal judges as a group are among the most ethical, professional, and
disinterested decision-makers we have.”).
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the adequacy of plaintiffs’ proof and drafting orders to accomplish complete relief for plaintiffs without completely
disadvantaging defendants. If relief requires nationwide coverage, the judge has equitable jurisdiction and equitable discretion
to grant and draft that order. Putting the critics’ arguments behind us, the federal procedural process includes principles of
confinement that, applied with a healthy dose of deference to official defendants, accomplish those goals.

